Published on
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NOTE
Torch Electronics, LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)
Lucas Reed*
I. Introduction
In 2021, Missouri stood at a crossroads between two billion-dollar industries: state-licensed casino gaming and a rapidly expanding “gray market” of unregulated video lottery terminals.[1] At stake was not just tax revenue or market share, but the very framework of how Missouri regulates one of America’s oldest vices.[2] When state authorities began seizing gaming machines from convenience stores across Missouri, the resulting legal battle would test the boundaries between criminal law enforcement and civil rights, challenging courts to balance the interests of licensed gaming operators against those seeking to expand the industry beyond its traditional confines.[3]
Missouri has long maintained a complex relationship with gambling, choosing to regulate it through various controlled channels including state lottery, horse racing, riverboat casinos, charity bingo, and raffles.[4] Since 2019,[5] a new challenge has emerged in the form of “gray market” machines called video lottery terminals (VLTs), which have proliferated across convenience stores, retailers, and lodges throughout the state.[6] While nine states, including Illinois, have chosen to legalize and regulate similar machines outside traditional casinos,[7] Missouri’s legislature has repeatedly rejected attempts to explicitly legalize VLTs.[8] Before Torch Electronics, LLC v. Missouri Department of Public Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024), was decided, there had been only one instance of successful prosecution of a VLT owner in Missouri.[9]
When the Missouri State Highway Patrol (“Highway Patrol”) began seizing Torch Electronics devices from multiple locations as illegal “gambling devices,”[10] the resulting legal challenge forced courts to confront a fundamental question: who has the power to determine the legality of these devices?[11] The court’s answer—dismissing both Torch’s request for protection and the licensed gaming industry’s plea for enforcement—highlights the limitations of civil courts in resolving what is essentially a criminal law dispute.[12] Since this decision, few criminal charges have been raised by county prosecutors,[13] and the Attorney General has continued to avoid exercising his power to enforce chapter 572 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (“RSMo”).[14]
This Note examines how Missouri’s traditional judicial framework struggles to address modern gaming controversies.[15] Part II details the factual background and procedural history of Torch Electronics. Part III explores the relevant legal background, including the Declaratory Judgment Act’s impact on standing requirements, the duties imposed on licensed gaming companies, and Missouri’s historical approach to gaming regulation. Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision and reasoning. Part V argues that while the Court correctly applied existing precedent, its decision exposes fundamental gaps in Missouri’s gaming regulatory framework that leave licensed operators without civil recourse against unlicensed competition. Finally, Part VI concludes by considering the broader implications for gaming regulation in Missouri.
II. Facts and Holding
A. Facts
Torch Electronics, LLC (“Torch”) operates and licenses electronic gaming devices and places those devices in convenience stores owned by Warrenton Oil Co. (“Warrenton”) according to a license agreement.[16] In December 2020, a Highway Patrol Officer visited a Warrenton convenience store and warned them that if the Torch devices were not removed from the premises, the Highway Patrol would seize them.[17] The officer returned on February 3, 2021, seizing three Torch devices.[18] The devices were seized from other stores in Franklin, Henry, and Linn counties.[19] Around this time, the Linn County Prosecutor filed felony charges against Torch, but the charges were dismissed.[20]
Along with these seizures, the Highway Patrol had sent prosecutors 190 cases in 2019 and 2020 requesting charges for illegal gambling, many of which were not filed.[21] Some county prosecutors, however, sent letters warning convenience stores to shut down their Torch devices, citing the Highway Patrol’s interpretation and application of the term “gambling device” under Missouri law.[22] The Henry County prosecutor filed a civil public nuisance action against Clinton Convenience, LLC.[23] Members of the Highway Patrol also seized devices from the Clinton Convenience Store.[24] The Highway Patrol insisted Torch’s amusement devices were “gambling devices” under Missouri law and intended to continue seizing them.[25]
B. Procedural Posture
Torch Electronics and Warrenton Oil (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action against the Highway Patrol and the Missouri Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) in February 2021.[26] Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating their devices were not “gambling devices” as defined in RSMo section 572.010 and that they “have a legal right to operate the amusement devices and/or locate them within businesses controlled by Plaintiffs.”[27] In a separate count, they sought to enjoin the Highway Patrol and DPS from “enforcing any policy that declares Torch’s amusement devices to be gambling devices” and removing them from convenience stores.[28]
The Missouri Gaming Association sought and was granted leave to intervene as a matter of right, under Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 52.12.[29] The Gaming Association is a statewide organization consisting of the casinos it licenses.[30] The Gaming Association’s purpose is to: (1) support its membership with research and analysis of policy issues facing the industry; (2) assist members to operate and grow responsibly and successfully in the existing environment; and (3) advocate for its members by communicating with policymakers and litigating on behalf of its members.[31] Once granted leave to intervene, the Gaming Association filed a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against Plaintiffs.[32] It asserted that Plaintiffs are not —nor could they be—licensed by the Missouri Gaming Commission as operators of gambling games in a lawful casino, and claimed that the “unregulated and unlawful placement and operation of [Torch’s] illegal devices . . . has resulted in and will continue to result in lost casino and non-casino income and business for the Gaming Association’s members.”[33] The Gaming Association sought a declaratory judgment that Torch’s devices “are illegal lotteries under Article II, Section 39(9) of the Missouri Constitution,” that the devices are illegal lotteries, slot machines, and gambling devices under RSMo chapter 572 (governing gambling crimes), and that Plaintiffs are jointly operating an unlawful gambling activity proscribed by RSMo chapter 313 (governing licensed gaming activities).[34] The Gaming Association also requested an injunction that would prohibit Plaintiffs from operating the devices.[35]
Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the Gaming Association’s counterclaim because it lacked standing and “failed to state a claim for declaratory judgment,” in that the Gaming Association had no justiciable controversy.[36] This was under the theory that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not permit a private entity to sue another entity regarding a statute’s interpretation and/or application.[37] The trial court dismissed the counterclaims on the ground that they “lack a justiciable controversy against Plaintiffs.”[38]
The Highway Patrol and DPS moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended petition, asserting (1) “the request to enter a judgment over the meaning and whether a gaming device falls within or outside certain criminal statutes is an improper use of the declaratory judgment act,” (2) the trial court lacked inherent authority to prospectively direct law enforcement agencies over how to exercise their police power, (3) the issue was “not ripe,” and (4) Plaintiffs had “available remedies at law and [could not] show an irreparable injury.”[39] The trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief on all of these grounds, noting that “[p]laintiffs’ relief sought under the Declaratory Judgment Act is not proper as it seeks a declaration over the application of criminal statutes without a concurrent claim regarding unconstitutionality.”[40] The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief “as the relief sought is outside the jurisdiction of this Court in which it is asked to invade/limit the exercise of legitimate police powers by the Defendant the Missouri State Highway Patrol.”[41] The trial court also found Plaintiffs “have available remedies at law and have not suffered irreparable harm.”[42] The Gaming Association’s counterclaim was dismissed on the ground that its claims “lacked a justiciable controversy against Plaintiffs.”[43]
Plaintiffs’ and the Gaming Association’s appeals were rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri, which affirmed the dismissals because they sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding a criminal statute without challenging its constitutionality or validity—a situation where Missouri courts do not provide equitable relief.[44] Without raising such a challenge, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Gaming Association could pursue the remedies they sought.[45] The Supreme Court of Missouri denied both the Plaintiffs’ and the Gaming Association’s applications for transfer.[46]
III. Legal Background
To fully appreciate the effect this decision has on the Missouri gaming industry, an analysis of two key legal frameworks is vital: (1) the doctrinal requirements for standing in Missouri courts, particularly in the declaratory relief context and associational standing; and (2) Missouri’s comprehensive framework for regulating gaming activities, including both its constitutional foundations and implementation through statutes and regulations.
1. The Declaratory Judgment Act: RSMo Chapter 527
Missouri’s Declaratory Judgment Act (“Act”) was designed to “settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.”[47] The Act “is to be liberally construed and administered.”[48] The Missouri Supreme Court has listed factors to consider in an action seeking such a declaration: public policy and interest, efficiency, convenience, economy, the good or bad faith of the party bringing the action, and whether the court’s administration of the Declaratory Judgment Act served the purposes for which it was enacted.[49] A declaratory judgment action does not require a state action and can be sought among private parties.[50] Multiple cases have involved courts declaring the meaning and intent of a statute without government involvement.[51]
In Legal Communications Corp. v. St. Louis County Printing & Publishing Co., the Eastern District was called upon to handle an allegation of unlawful competition.[52] The plaintiff sought a declaration that another market competitor failed to meet the qualifications of RSMo section 493.100 and that it was not qualified to publish legal notices.[53] The court reviewed the statutory framework, finding that it mandates certain requirements to achieve its goal of giving notice to the widest audience possible.[54] It was determined that to achieve the statute’s goal, a newspaper must be allowed to compete with other newspapers successfully.[55] The court held that the plaintiff had standing to bring the action because it was forced to face illegitimate competition, its ability to compete would be impeded, and the purpose of RSMo section 493.100 would be frustrated.[56]
2. The Eagleton Doctrine and its Progeny
The Eagleton doctrine states that generally, Missouri courts cannot enter a declaratory judgment or other injunctive relief that interferes with criminal law enforcement.[57] Some of the policy reasons for this rule include the difference in the burden of proof between criminal prosecution and an action for equitable relief and respecting the constitutional and statutory duties of prosecutors to enforce criminal laws by not allowing private parties to seek enforcement.[58] There is an exception to this general rule “where the criminal law in question is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid and the attempted enforcement would constitute a direct invasion of property rights resulting in irreparable injury.”[59] Both elements, statutory invalidity and irreparable harm, must be present and clearly appear for this exception to apply.[60] If this exception applies, courts may then entertain declaratory judgment actions concerning criminal laws where the action challenges the law’s constitutionality or validity.[61]
3. Associational Standing
A party must satisfy a three-prong test before being granted associational standing.[62] As set forth by the Missouri Supreme Court:
To gain associational standing in Missouri, an association must show: (1) its members would have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests that the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members.[63]
Missouri’s test is an adoption of the federal Hunt framework for analyzing associational standing.[64] To satisfy the first prong, that its members would have standing to sue in their own right, the Supreme Court of Missouri has developed a plain language test:
Reduced to its essence, standing roughly means that the parties seeking relief must have some personal interest at stake in the dispute, even if that interest is attenuated, slight or remote. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). In the context of an action for declaratory judgment, Missouri courts require that the plaintiff have a legally protectable interest at stake in the outcome of the litigation. Battlefield Fire Protection District v. City of Springfield, 941 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. banc 1997). A legally protectable interest exists if the plaintiff is directly and adversely affected by the action in question or if the plaintiff’s interest is conferred by statute. Id.[65]
As to the germaneness prong, the issue need not be central to the organizational purpose;[66] “mere pertinence between litigation subject and organizational purpose is sufficient.”[67] Where associations seek only prospective remedies, it is presumed the relief to be gained “will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.”[68] Accordingly, an association’s requests for such relief generally do not require the individual participation of its members.[69]
B. Missouri Gaming Regulatory Framework
1. Constitutional Foundation and Development
a. History of Gaming Expansion
Missouri has a longstanding prohibition on lotteries, enshrined in both the 1875 and 1945 state constitutions, with exceptions allowed only by voter approval.[70] This ban on lotteries was extended in 1992 to include slot machines, but Missourians voted to make an exception for slot machines in 1994.[71] In 1997, the Supreme Court of Missouri again was asked to limit gambling in Missouri by forbidding facilities along artificial basins.[72] The Missouri Constitution was amended the following year to make an exception allowing for gaming facilities in artificial basins.[73] However, this trend of expansion was scaled back in 2004 when voters rejected an amendment to allow a gaming facility in Rockaway Beach.[74] A few years later, voters again chose to restrict the scope of gaming in Missouri by confining the number of licensed casinos to those already built or under construction at that time.[75] Most recently, Missouri passed a sports betting amendment in 2024 by a voter margin of roughly 3,000 voters.[76] During the same election, an amendment that would have authorized another casino to operate at the Lake of the Ozarks was rejected by the voters.[77] Outside of statewide regulation, some local governments separately prohibit gaming via charter amendment or ordinance.[78]
b. Divergent Approaches to “Vice” Regulation
The Missouri Constitution treats gambling differently than marijuana. Gambling is heavily restricted by the constitution, limiting the state legislature’s authority to legalize gambling within prescribed exceptions.[79] As such, gambling is generally prohibited except for those instances where it is specifically authorized in the constitution.[80] The people must approve these “constitutional carveouts,” which are further regulated by the legislature under RSMo chapter 313.[81] Marijuana legalization and regulation was passed in 2022—more recently than all of the “constitutional carveouts” found in the gambling provisions.[82] Unlike the gambling provisions which begin with prohibition and carve out exceptions,[83] article XIV, section 2 affirmatively establishes rights for marijuana possession and cultivation by individuals, subject to specific quantity limitations.[84] This is notable since marijuana is a drug,[85] which is considered one of the major vices.[86] Another important distinction is the brevity of the constitutional provisions for gambling when compared to the regulatory framework for marijuana. This can be partly explained by the gambling regulations in RSMo chapter 313, which includes sections that establish the regulatory body—the Missouri Gaming Commission—and other provisions related to the exceptions under article III, section 39(9).[87] In contrast, most marijuana regulations are found in the constitution.[88]
2. Licensed Gaming Operations and Obligations
Being granted a gaming license to operate an excursion gambling boat and/or to conduct gambling games on such a boat is an exclusive privilege that is otherwise unlawful under Missouri law.[89] As a licensed operator of an excursion gambling boat or of gambling games, one must incur a substantial financial investment by the payment of gaming taxes on gaming revenue,[90] the cost of regulation by the Missouri Gaming Commission,[91] and contribution to the compulsive gamblers fund.[92] Through compliance with RSMo chapter 313, licensure entails the generation of taxes and fees that fund education, law enforcement, and veterans programs throughout Missouri;[93] promotion of affirmative action hiring within the industry;[94] and strict regulation, monitoring, and controls of their gaming activities to protect the public and ensure integrity in the legal gaming industry.[95]
3. Enforcement History Against Unlicensed Gaming
Missouri’s history of enforcing voter-approved restrictions, including pre-reveal games, can be dated back to City of Moberly v. Deskin in 1913.[96] The Court found that Deskin’s “Automatic Gum Vender” machine, regardless of its “pre-reveal” function was designed to entice continued play “in the hope that the next time the finger would point to trade checks, and thus bring something from nothing,” thus constituting a gambling device.[97] This precedent was reinforced in Thole v. Westfall, where video poker and slot machines were deemed illegal gambling devices under RSMo chapter 572.[98] Since Thole, Missouri courts have continuously been asked to determine which machines are “gambling devices.”[99] In 2019, the Platte County Prosecutor charged Integrity Vending with promoting gambling in the first degree.[100] The devices at issue were “No Chance Gaming” machines manufactured by Banilla Games.[101] The trial court rejected the argument that because the game had a “pre-reveal” or “prize-winner” button, it was not a gaming device, and it found Integrity Vending guilty of “promoting gambling” in the first degree.[102]
IV. Instant Decision
In Torch Electronics, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with the entire panel concurring.[103] In summary, Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief would obstruct Missouri’s ability to enforce criminal laws.[104] Since the Plaintiffs had not contested the constitutionality or legality of section 572.010, defining gambling, they are subject to the standard rule that Missouri courts do not provide equitable relief that would hinder the enforcement of criminal law.[105] As a result, the court found that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ amended petition.[106]
The court found the Plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid Eagleton and its progeny’s application unpersuasive.[107] Despite the Plaintiffs’ assertion that section 572.010 is not a criminal statute, the court disagreed, given the statute’s placement in the Criminal Code and the Plaintiffs’ lack of licensure under chapter 313 (governing licensed gambling activities).[108] Plaintiffs were not licensed at any time to conduct gambling activities, and possession and promotion of gambling via the operation of a “gambling device” without a license are crimes.[109] The declaration being sought—whether Plaintiffs’ devices are “gambling devices” under section 572.010(5)—effectively would determine whether the devices in question are criminal.[110] The court concluded that such a declaration would interfere with the enforcement of criminal law.[111] It was deemed “evident” from the Plaintiffs’ amended petition that their main objective in bringing this action is to enjoin Highway Patrol from determining their devices are criminal and seizing them.[112]
After determining that the statute was criminal, the court addressed the Plaintiffs’ contention that Missouri courts had authorized declaratory judgment actions interpreting criminal laws in the past without challenging the law’s constitutionality or validity.[113] The court found the caselaw on which Plaintiffs relied to be unfounded because the law interpreted was civil, not criminal.[114] With no other support presented for the Plaintiffs’ contention, the court continued to apply the Eagleton rule.[115]
The Gaming Association also sought a “mirroring” declaration that would require the trial court to interpret what qualifies as a criminal law.[116] In its counterclaim, the Gaming Association requested the trial court declare that the Plaintiffs were operating “an unlawful gambling activity” proscribed by chapter 572 and section 313.830 (a statute that sets forth various gambling offenses and their criminal penalties),[117] that Torch’s devices were illegal slot machines and gambling devices under chapter 572, and that Torch’s devices were illegal lotteries under chapter 572 and article III, section 39(9) of the Missouri Constitution.[118] Without a challenge to the constitutionality or validity of the law, the court concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the Gaming Association’s counterclaim as well.[119]
V. Comment
The Western District’s decision in Torch Electronics correctly navigates the complex intersection of criminal law enforcement and civil remedies while inadvertently highlighting fundamental tensions in Missouri’s approach to vice regulation. While procedurally sound, the decision exposes critical gaps in the state’s ability to protect legitimate market participants from unlicensed competition. This Comment first examines the court’s sound application of the Eagleton doctrine and its underlying policy rationales. It then analyzes the unique challenges presented by Missouri’s binary approach to vice regulation, particularly comparing its gaming and marijuana frameworks. Next, it explores the tension between the Eagleton doctrine’s limitations on civil remedies and the legitimate interests of licensed operators in protection from unlicensed competition. Finally, it considers the practical aftermath of the decision and its implications for Missouri’s gaming regulatory framework, concluding with potential policy solutions to address the regulatory gaps exposed by the case.
A. Applying Eagleton
The court was correct in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ and the Gaming Association’s actions for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as they were not accompanied by a constitutional challenge or otherwise challenging the validity of RSMo section 572.010.[120] Even with such a challenge, seeking a declaratory judgment to interpret the meaning of section 572.010 would be difficult given that a state statute is presumed constitutional and will not be held otherwise without showing that it undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional provision.[121] Given the constitutional framework surrounding gambling and the state’s policy interests in protecting the public from what many still deem one of the “major vices,” a challenge to the statute becomes virtually impossible. Missouri has a longstanding tradition of restricting gambling and, as such, retains a public policy interest in protecting the public from gambling.[122] Notably, the electoral success of legalized sports betting in Missouri came down to less than three-thousand votes.[123]
B. A Dichotomy of Vices
Missouri’s contrasting regulatory approaches to gambling and marijuana illuminate a fundamental shift in the state’s philosophy toward vice regulation. While both activities were previously prohibited outright, the state has developed vastly different regulatory frameworks that reflect the evolution of social attitudes and policy objectives.
The gambling framework represents a more traditional “prohibitionist” approach, where the activity is constitutionally prohibited with authorized exceptions. This framework emerged through decades of incremental amendments, each requiring voter approval to expand legal gambling within carefully prescribed limits.[124] The resulting system creates a closed market where gambling is presumptively illegal unless explicitly authorized and licensed. This approach is reinforced by comprehensive statutory controls in RSMo chapter 313, including licensing requirements, operational constraints, and regulatory oversight by the Missouri Gaming Commission.[125]
In contrast, Missouri’s adoption of article XIV, section 2 by citizen initiative petition represents a modern “rights-based” approach to regulating marijuana. Rather than starting from the presumption of illegality, the marijuana framework first establishes affirmative rights for possession and cultivation, subject to quantity limitations and regulatory oversight.[126] This dichotomy creates unique challenges for courts and regulators. For gambling, the prohibitionist approach requires strict interpretation of exceptions, potentially limiting judicial discretion in civil matters as demonstrated in Torch Electronics. Marijuana’s rights-based approach in Missouri provides greater flexibility for civil remedies, as there is a constitutional right to which a party can point when challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute that involves marijuana.
This contrast also raises important policy questions about the evolution of Missouri vice regulation. The regulation framework surrounding gambling reflects historical concerns about its social harm and the need for strict control and preservation of existing commercial interests, whereas marijuana regulation suggests an approach that attempts to balance individual rights with public safety concerns. This shift indicates an emphasis on harm mitigation rather than outright prohibition. However, the gambling framework’s rigidity may also serve important policy objectives—namely, protecting consumers and ensuring market integrity. The framework, coupled with the strict licensure requirements in RSMo chapter 313, provides mechanisms to address problem gambling, prevent youth access, and maintain fiscal accountability.[127] Such protections may be more difficult to implement under a rights-based approach.
C. Eagleton’s Limitations on Civil Remedies
The court’s strict application of the Eagleton doctrine reveals significant gaps in Missouri’s gaming regulation enforcement framework. While the doctrine serves important policy interests by preventing interference with criminal law enforcement,[128] it simultaneously creates a regulatory vacuum where licensed operators, like those in the Missouri Gaming Association, have no civil recourse against unlicensed competitors. This limitation becomes particularly problematic in the context of Missouri’s gaming regulatory scheme, where the state has created legitimate market participants with substantial invested interests.[129]
Licensed operators must make substantial investments to obtain and maintain licensure, including paying gaming taxes, funding regulatory oversight, and contributing to compulsive gambler programs.[130] When faced with unlicensed competition that bears none of these costs/investments, these operators are left without civil standing to challenge them unless a constitutional challenge can be mounted. This creates a paradox where the remedy could potentially invalidate the challenger’s legal basis for operation. The gaming context of Torch Electronics presents striking parallels to that of Legal Communications: licensed operators face competition from entities that fail to meet statutory requirements, potentially undermining the comprehensive regulatory framework.[131] However, the Eagleton doctrine forecloses relief to licensed players in an otherwise illegal market simply because the applicable statutes are criminal in nature rather than civil.[132]
D. What Missouri is Left With
The tension between market protection and criminal enforcement highlights a fundamental flaw in Missouri’s gaming regulatory framework. Unlike other regulated industries where civil or administrative remedies complement criminal enforcement, the gaming industry’s foundation in criminal law creates an all-or-nothing enforcement regime. This becomes particularly problematic when (1) few county prosecutors pursue these cases and (2) the Attorney General’s office recuses itself, despite its concurrent jurisdiction under Chapter 313.[133]
This flaw undermines several key objectives of Missouri gaming law. First, it compromises the state’s ability to maintain strict oversight of gaming operations. Licensed operators must comply with extensive regulations and fund oversight while unlicensed operators are allowed to operate in a legal “gray area” without immediate consequences. Second, it potentially undermines the state’s public protection measures.[134] Licensed operators must implement age restrictions and other consumer protections, including funding the state’s problem gambling program—requirements that unlicensed operators do not face.[135] Finally, it creates market inefficiencies in that unlicensed operators are allowed to operate in the gray area, avoiding substantial regulatory costs while taking a substantial market share from licensed competition.[136]
VI. Conclusion
The Torch Electronics decision effectively closes the door on civil remedies for resolving the legality of “gray market” gaming devices, leaving enforcement solely in the hands of criminal prosecutors. Without a constitutional challenge to the underlying statutory framework, both operators seeking to validate their machines and licensed casinos attempting to protect their market share find themselves without civil recourse. This creates a paradoxical situation where thousands of unlicensed machines can continue operating in legal limbo, protected not by their legitimacy but by the procedural limitations of civil courts to address criminal matters. The single successful prosecution in Platte County stands as an isolated example of enforcement, while the Attorney General’s recusal and many prosecutors’ reluctance to pursue these cases suggests that comprehensive enforcement remains unlikely.
The impact of this decision extends far beyond the immediate parties involved. Missouri’s carefully constructed gaming regulatory framework—built on voter-approved constitutional amendments and legislative oversight—now faces unprecedented strain. Licensed operators, who must “pay to play,” must compete with unlicensed operators who bear no costs or responsibilities. More critically, the decision highlights a growing disconnect between traditional regulatory frameworks and modern gaming technology, leaving Missouri’s vulnerable populations—particularly, children and low-income individuals—without the protections licensed gaming operations must provide. Until constitutional reform is enacted to legalize and regulate VLTs, we must wait for our state’s prosecutors to enforce RSMo chapter 572 using the “Platte County blueprint.” Otherwise, Missouri’s gaming industry will continue to operate in an increasingly unstable regulatory environment where authorized and unauthorized operators compete on fundamentally uneven ground.
*B.S., Murray State University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2026; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2024–2025. I am grateful to Professor Rigel Oliveri for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
[1] See Rudi Keller, Legislative Gridlock on Gambling Puts ‘Grey Market’ Machines before Missouri Courts, Mo. Indep. (Jun 8, 2021), https://missouriindependent.com/2021/06/08/legislative-gridlock-on-gambling-puts-gray-market-machines-before-missouri-courts/.
[2] See Robert Laplaca, Gambling 101: The Vice That’s Getting More Nice, You Might Be a Winner (Apr. 28, 2022), https://www.verrill-law.com/you-might-be-a-winner/gambling-101-the-vice-thats-getting-more-nice.
[3] See Keller, supra note 1.
[4] Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 39(a)–(c), (e)–(g).
[5] See Keller, supra note 1.
[6] 14,000 to 20,000 of these machines are estimated to be in Missouri. Missouri Seeks Solution To Grey-Market Games, No Love For Virginia’s Skill Game Ban, Vixio (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.vixio.com/insights/gc-missouri-seeks-solution-grey-market-games-no-love-virginias-skill-game-ban#:~:text=Currently%2C%20authorities%20estimate%20there%20are,based%20games%20outside%20a%20casino.
[7] Id.
[8] These efforts have often been tied to sports betting bills. See Matthew Kredell, Push to Pass Sports Betting/VLT Bill Fails in Missouri Senate, Play Missouri (April 29, 2021), https://www.playmissouri.com/news/missouri-sports-betting-senate-floor/; Chase Matteson, Sports Betting Fails to Pass in Missouri for Second Consecutive Year, KOMU (May 13, 2022), https://www.komu.com/news/state/sports-betting-fails-to-pass-in-missouri-for-second-consecutive-year/article_e2d533b8-d2e5-11ec-9515-337b92ec8f10.html; Emily Manley, Why Sports Betting Struck Out Again Among Missouri Lawmakers, FOX2now (May 17, 2023, 6:20 PM), https://fox2now.com/news/missouri/why-sports-betting-struck-out-again-among-missouri-lawmakers/.
[9] 19AE-CR00948-01 – St. v. Integrity Vending, LLC (E-Case), Mo. Casenet, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=19AE-CR00948-01&inputVO.courtId=SMPDB0001_CT06&inputVO.isTicket=false#docket (last visited Apr. 29, 2025) (Platte County prosecution where a judgment was entered on December 4, 2020).
[10] The Missouri Gaming Commission believes Torch’s machines are illegal. See Paula Vasan, As unregulated gaming machines flood Missouri, many argue they put children at risk, KDSK (June 14, 2024, 6:09 AM), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/investigations/unregulated-gambling-machines-flood-missouri-children-at-risk/63-2c6aee16-e1a5-47af-bf1d-100b46cc809d.
[11] Torch Elecs., LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[12] Id. at 548–52.
[13] See 20HE-CC00064 – State of Missouri ex rel. v. Ranza Inc.et al. (E-Case), Mo. Casenet, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=20HE-CC00064&inputVO.courtId=SMPDB0005_CT27#docket [hereinafter 20HE-CC00064] (Henry County case, charging the defendant with two counts of promoting gambling – first degree and possession of gambling device); see also 20AB-CR03465 – St. v. James McNutt (E-Case) Mo. Casenet, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=20AB-CR03465&inputVO.courtId=SMPDB0004_CT20&inputVO.isTicket=false#docket [hereinafter 20AB-CR03465] (Franklin County case, charging defendant with three counts of possession of gambling device). Both of these cases are set for trial in 2025.
[14] Rudi Keller, Missouri AG drops out of gambling case after taking donations from companies suing state, Mo. Indep. (Apr 25, 2023, 3:26 PM), https://missouriindependent.com/2023/04/25/missouri-ag-drops-out-of-gambling-case-after-taking-donations-from-companies-suing-state/ [hereinafter Keller, AG Drops Out]; see also Rudi Keller, Few charges result from scores of Missouri highway patrol gambling investigations, Mo. Indep. (Sep. 14, 2021, 5:55 AM), https://missouriindependent.com/2021/09/14/few-charges-result-from-scores-of-missouri-highway-patrol-gambling-investigations/.
[15] See infra, Part V.C–D.
[16] These devices operate using Banilla Games software; the same software used in the devices in State v. Integrity Vending, LLC, held to be “gambling devices.” Brief for Appellant at 15, n. 2; Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 552. See 19AE-CR00948-01 – St. v. Integrity Vending, LLC (E-Case), Mo. Casenet, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=19AE-CR00948-01&inputVO.courtId=SMPDB0001_CT06&inputVO.isTicket=false#docket (last visited Apr. 29, 2025).
[17] Amended Brief of Respondents/Cross–Appellants at 12; Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 552.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] See Rudi Keller, Appeals court rules Torch Electronics had no grounds to sue over Missouri gambling enforcement, Mo. Indep., (May 28, 2024, 3:06 PM), https://missouriindependent.com/2024/05/28/appeals-court-rules-torch-electronics-had-no-grounds-to-sue-over-missouri-gambling-enforcement/.
[21] Rudi Keller, Few Missouri prosecutors file gambling charges sought by patrol, Mo. Indep. (Mar. 11, 2021, 9:42 AM), https://missouriindependent.com/2021/03/11/few-missouri-prosecutors-file-gambling-charges-sought-by-patrol/.
[22] Amended Brief of Respondents/Cross-Appellants, supra note 17, at 12.
[23] 20HE-CC00064, supra note 13.
[24] Amended Brief of Respondents/Cross-Appellants, supra note 17, at 13.
[25] Id.; Torch Elecs., LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[26] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 550.
[27] Id. (internal quotations omitted); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 572.010 (2016).
[28] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 550–51 (internal quotations omitted).
[29] Id. at 550.
[30] Id. By operation of Mo. Rev. Stat. §313.780, there is a limit of thirteen casino licenses that may be issued in Missouri. See Joe McLean, Missouri voters may decide whether to allow 14th casino, KFVS, (May 6, 2024, 8:41PM), https://www.kfvs12.com/2024/05/07/missouri-voters-may-decide-whether-allow-14th-casino/. A Missouri casino may only be operated on an “excursion gambling boat” that is licensed by the Missouri Gaming Commission. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §313.800.1(9) (2016).
[31] Brief of Appellant at 18; Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[32] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 551.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 527.010 (2016) (Declaratory Judgment Act).
[38] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 551.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 551–52.
[44] Id. at 550.
[45] Id.
[46] Minutes of September 3, 2024, Supreme Court of Missouri (Sept. 3, 2024), https://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/cfc8c4b5bc15cb158625661d0073593c/a803c17768eb72da86258b8a00569bba?OpenDocument (denying the applications for transfer in SC100649 and SC100650). Applications for transfer in Missouri function like appeals. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 83.
[47] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 527.120 (2016).
[48] Id.
[49] Preferred Physicians Mut. Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Grp., 916 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Terte, 176 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. 1943) (en banc)).
[50] See Westphal v. Lake Lotawana Ass’n, 95 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Mo. Ct. App.2003) (citing Hall v. Am. Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (“state action is not required for this declaratory judgment claim”)); see also Terre Du Lac Ass’n, v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (homeowners’ association brought declaratory judgment action against subdivision developer); Washington Univ. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 801 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (landlord sought declaration under statute); Jones v. Jones, 285 S.W.3d 356 (Mo. App. 2009) (corporate officer brought declaratory judgment against other corporate officer).
[51] See, e.g., Beavers v. Recreation Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, 130 S.W. 3d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (defining the meaning of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 355.507); Legal Communications Corp. v. St. Louis County Printing & Pub. Co. 24 S.W.3d 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (defining Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 493.070, 493.100); Manufacturers’ & Mechanics’ Bank v. Twelfth St. Bank, 223 Mo. App. 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (defining Mo. Rev. Stat. § 5744 (1919)).
[52] Legal Commc’ns Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 744.
[53] Id. at 747; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 493.100 (2016) (governing the sale of certain real estate published in certain newspapers (cities of 600,000 or more)).
[54] Legal Commc’ns Corp. 24 S.W.3d at 748.
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Mo. 1964) (en banc). See Burnau v. Whitten, 642 S.W.2d 346, 346 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (“Generally, courts of equity are without jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of criminal statutes.”); see also Kan. City v. Mary Don Co., 606 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Mo. Ct. App.1980) (“It is true, generally speaking, that a court of equity will not permit itself to be used as a medium for the enforcement of criminal laws or quasi-criminal ordinances.”).
[58] Torch Elecs., LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[59] Eagleton, 378 S.W.2d at 453. See Burnau v. Whitten, 642 S.W.2d 346, 346 (Mo.1982) (en banc).
[60] Eagleton, 378 S.W.2d at 453.
[61] See, e.g., Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589 (Mo. 2018) (en banc); Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, 762 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
[62] E. Mo. Coal. of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
[63] Id.
[64] Mo. Outdoor Advertising Ass’n, v. Mo. State Hwy. & Transp. Comm., 826 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (adopting the Hunt framework of establishing associational standing). Associational standing is permitted when:
(1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of each of the individual members.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
[65] Ste. Genevieve Sch. Dist. R II v. Bd. of Aldermen, 66 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
[66] Demanding centrality of purpose would contravene the “plain meaning of the term ‘germane.’” Humane Soc. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 53 n. 10.
[67] See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
[68] See Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).
[69] Home Builders Ass’n v. City of Wildwood, 32 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
[70] See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 10 (1875) (prohibiting lotteries with no exceptions); Mo. Const. art. III, § 39(b) (creating the state lottery); Mo. Const. art. III, § 39(e) (authorizing riverboat gambling).
[71] Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.1994) (en banc). This was secured with Amendment 6 on the November 8, 1994, ballot as an initiated constitutional amendment. David C. Valentine, Constitutional Amendments, Statutory Revision and Referenda Submitted to the Voters by the General Assembly or by Initiative Petition, 1910–2010 (2010), [hereinafter Valentine], https://web.archive.org/web/20140502223410/http://ipp.missouri.edu/files/ipp/attachments/19-2010_constitutional_amendments.pdf.
[72] Akin v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 956 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
[73] Mo. Const. art. III, § 39(e); Valentine, supra note 71, at 8.
[74] Valentine, supra note 71, at 8; see Voters Display Gambling Fatigue, Kansas City Star, Aug. 5, 2004, 2004 WLNR 25489149.
[75] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.780 (2016).
[76] This was out of 2.9 million votes cast in Missouri during the election. See Rudi Keller, Missouri voters narrowly approve sports betting amendment, Mo. Indep. (Nov. 6, 2024, 2:06AM), https://missouriindependent.com/2024/11/06/missouri-voters-narrowly-approve-sports-betting-amendment/.
[77] See Meg Cunningham, Missouri Amendment 5: Voters reject casino at the Lake of the Ozarks, The Beacon (Nov. 6, 2024, 1:21 PM), https://www.kcur.org/politics-elections-and-government/2024-11-06/missouri-amendment-5-casino-lake-ozarks.
[78] See, e.g., Charter of the City of Jefferson, Missouri, art. XV, §15.1; Jefferson City’s Gambling Reversal Divides Experts on Reasons Why, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 12, 1995, 1995 WLNR 787459. This prohibition survived an attempt at repeal in 2008. Jefferson City Rejects Proposals for Casinos, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 9, 2008, 2008 WLNR 6637200.
[79] Mo. Const. art. III, § 39(9).
[80] Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 39(a)–(c), (e)–(g).
[81] Supra Part III.B.1.
[82] See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
[83] Supra Part III.B.1.
[84] See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
[85] Marijuana is a Schedule I drug/substance under the Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule I(c) (schedules of controlled substances).
[86] See Robert M. Jarvis et. al., Gaming Law and Gambling Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 59 (Carolina Academic Press, 2d ed. 2021) (including drugs among the other major vices of gambling, alcohol, sex, and tobacco).
[87] See Mo. Rev. Stat. §313.004 (2016) (“There is hereby created the ‘Missouri Gaming Commission’ consisting of five members appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate”); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 313.005–085 (2016) (regulating bingo in Missouri); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 313.200–351 (2016) (regulating the state lottery); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 313.500–720 (2016) (regulating horse betting); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 313.780–850 (2016) (regulating excursion gambling boats).
[88] See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
[89] See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 572.015 (2016); Mo. Const. art. III § 39(9).
[90] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.822 (2016); see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.826 (2016).
[91] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.824 (2016); see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.835 (2016).
[92] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.842 (2016).
[93] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.822 (2016).
[94] See Enforcement Division, Mo. Gaming Comm’n para. 6, https://www.mgc.dps.mo.gov/FAQ_SiteLinks/div_Enforcement.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2025) (emphasizing the affirmative action plan required of all Class B licensees).
[95] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.805 (2016), (powers of the commission).
[96] See City of Moberly v. Deskin, 155 S.W. 842 (Mo. 1913).
[97] Id. at 844–45.
[98] Thole v. Westfall, 682 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Mo. Ct. App. E1984) (finding the machines to be illegal gambling machines because “coins were ‘staked or risked,’ winning was ‘purely a matter of luck, a matter of chance’ with the player having ‘no control over which combination of objects will appear,’ the machines awarded ‘something of value,’ and the ‘payoff percentages’ were determined by the machine itself, further indicating the player’s lack of control over the game”).
[99] See Chandler v. Hemeyer, 49 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming there was sufficient evidence to establish the machines seized were illegal “gambling devices”); Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6477 v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 260 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (finding machines were illegal gambling devices).
[100] 19AE-CR00948-01 – St. v. Integrity Vending, LLC (E-Case), Mo. Casenet, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=19AE-CR00948-01&inputVO.courtId=SMPDB0001_CT06&inputVO.isTicket=false#docket (last visited Apr. 29, 2025).
[101] Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at 15.
[102] Id.
[103] Torch Elecs., LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[104] Id. at 548, 555.
[105] Id. See State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Mo. 1964) (en banc) (“Generally a court of equity is without jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the criminal law.”). Courts, however, will entertain declaratory judgment actions concerning a criminal law where the action challenges the constitutionality or validity of the law. See, e.g., Alpert v State, 543 S.W.3d 589 (Mo 2018) (en banc); Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, 762 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
[106] See Burnau v. Whitten, 642 S.W.2d 346, 346–47 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (The trial court “properly dismissed [the appellants’] petition” for injunctive relief because they “failed to establish an exception to the general rule prohibiting equitable interference with criminal statutes . . . .”). See also State ex rel. Cervantes v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (concluding that without a ruling that the ordinance is invalid, a key element for the exception was missing, and the temporary injunction should not have been granted.); Cottleville Cmty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Morak, 897 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that interpreting the litigants’ rights was unauthorized under the declaratory judgment act because they sought clarification of a criminal statute).
[107] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 554–55.
[108] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 572.010 (2016) (defining various terms governing the criminalization of prohibited gambling activity and when it is not a crime); Mo. Rev. Stat. tit. XXXVIII (2016) (the Missouri Criminal Code).
[109] Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 572.070, 572.030 (2016).
[110] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 554.
[111] Id.
[112] Id.
[113] Id. at 555.
[114] See R.W. v. Sanders, 168 S.W.3d 65, 69–70 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (determining Missouri’s sex offender registration statutes “are civil and regulatory in nature”); see also Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (holding the registration statutes are “civil and not punitive”).
[115] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 555–56.
[116] Id. at 556.
[117] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.830 (2016). This statute lists all the recognized prohibited acts in the realm of gambling, instructs the Missouri Gaming Commission where it shall refer criminal violations of sections 313.800-850, and identifies the venue for such crimes when committed.
[118] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 556.
[119] Id.
[120] See Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589 (Mo 2018) (en banc); Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, 762 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). Without such an exception, the general rule that a court of equity is without jurisdiction to interfere with criminal law enforcement. See State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen, 378 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Mo. 1964) (en banc).
[121] Hickey v. Bd. of Ed., 256 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1953).
[122] Supra, Part III.B.
[123] See 2024 Ballot Measures, Mo. Sec. of State, https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2024BallotMeasures (last visited Apr. 30, 2025).
[124] Supra, Part III.B.1.a.
[125] Supra, Part III.B.2.
[126] See Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2 (“The purpose of this section is to make marijuana legal under state and local law for adults twenty-one years of age or older, and to control the commercial production and distribution of marijuana under a system that licenses, regulates, and taxes the businesses involved while protecting public health.”).
[127] Supra, Part III.B.2.
[128] Torch Electronics, LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 694 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).
[129] See Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 313.
[130] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.822.
[131] Legal Commc’ns Corp. v. St. Louis County Printing & Pub. Co., 24 S.W.3d 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
[132] Torch Elecs., LLC, 694 S.W.3d at 554.
[133] Keller, Missouri AG Drops Out, supra note 14. See also 20HE-CC00064, supra note 13; 20AB-CR03465, supra note 13.
[134] The state may exercise its police power to protect health and safety. See Women’s Kan. City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Mo., 58 F.2d 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1932). Preserving public health is a paramount end of the exercise of the state’s police power. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
[135] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.817 (2016) (requiring implementation of age restrictions); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 313.842 (2016) (requiring licensed operators contribute to the “problem gambling” fund).
[136] The American Gaming Association estimates that unregulated markets have cost the national legal gaming industry over forty-four billion dollars in gaming revenue and states over thirteen billion in lost tax revenue. See Robert Collins, US gambling’s illegal gray market, Gaming America (Jan. 20, 2023), https://gamingamerica.com/magazine/6913/us-gamblings-illegal-gray-market.