Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Federal Public Corruption Law

NOTE

Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024).

Andrew J. Durham*

I.  Introduction

Americans’ confidence in government has been declining for decades, and public corruption is widely understood to be part of the reason.  In 1958, 73% of Americans said they trusted the federal government to do the right thing most of the time.[1]  By 2023, that figure had fallen to 16%—a near seventy-year low.[2]  A 2024 survey by the Partnership for Public Service found that 67% of Americans viewed the federal government as “corrupt,” and only 23% said they trusted it at all.[3]  These numbers do not resolve the empirical question of how much corruption actually exists because corruption resists measurement by design.  They do, however, reflect a broad public sense that the government’s mechanisms for policing official misconduct are not working.  That sense, this Note argues, is not entirely mistaken.

The federal anti-corruption framework rests on a set of overlapping criminal statutes.  18 U.S.C. § 201 prohibits bribery and illegal gratuities paid to federal officials.[4]  18 U.S.C. § 1346 reaches schemes to deprive the public of “the intangible right of honest services.”[5]  The Hobbs Act extends to extortion under color of official right.[6]  And 18 U.S.C. § 666, the statute at issue in this case, extends federal anti-corruption prohibitions to state and local officials who administer billions of dollars in federal funds each year.[7]  Of these provisions, § 666 has been the workhorse: for two decades it has been the most frequently invoked charge in federal official corruption prosecutions, forming the backbone of federal enforcement against officials who misuse federally funded programs.[8]  In Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed that statute’s reach.[9]

This Note argues that Snyder is best understood not as an isolated interpretive dispute, but as the latest step in a decades-long pattern of judicial retrenchment.  Since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court has resolved textual ambiguities in federal anti-corruption statutes in a strikingly consistent direction: in favor of defendants and in a way that expands what this Note calls the “gray zone” between conduct that is obviously corrupt and conduct that federal law can actually reach.[10]  The Court has drawn a series of lines: between property and honest services in McNally v. United States,[11] between bribes and mere facilitation in McDonnell v. United States,[12] between regulatory power and property in Kelly v. United States,[13] and now between bribes and post hoc gratuities in Snyder.[14]  Each is defensible in isolation.  The problem lies in their accumulation.  The aggregate result is a federal anti-corruption framework that is considerably less capable of addressing the corruption it was built to address.

Part II sets out the facts of Snyder as both the majority and the full record present them and explains the Court’s holding.  Part III surveys the legal landscape: the federal anti-corruption statutes, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions narrowing their reach, and the circuit split over § 666 that the Court granted certiorari in Snyder to resolve.  Part IV analyzes the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch’s brief concurrence, and Justice Jackson’s dissent.  Part V argues that Snyder’s most important consequence is not what it decides, but what it exemplifies: a Court that has chosen, case by case, to treat ambiguity in the anti-corruption context as a reason to narrow the law.  Part VI concludes.

II. Facts and Holding

The facts of Snyder v. United States can be told two ways.[15]  The majority tells a spare, transactional story: a mayor, a contractor, and a check.[16]  The dissent tells the full story: a mayor who allegedly rigged a public bidding process, solicited payment from the winning contractor, lied to federal investigators, and pocketed $13,000 he never earned.[17]  That the same record can support two such different narratives is not merely a curiosity of appellate practice.  It is, as this Note argues, the central methodological problem with the majority’s approach.  It is also a preview of how the Court’s doctrinal choices in the anti-corruption space consistently resolve manufactured ambiguity in favor of defendants, even when the underlying conduct is anything but ambiguous.

A.  The Facts, as the Majority Tells Them

James Snyder served as the mayor of Portage, Indiana, a city of about 38,000 in the northwest region of the state.[18]  In 2013, the City of Portage awarded two contracts to Great Lakes Peterbilt (“Peterbilt”), a local truck dealership, for the purchase of garbage trucks.[19]  In total, the city paid approximately $1.1 million for five trucks.[20]  About a year after the contracts were awarded, Peterbilt issued a $13,000 check to Snyder, who was mayor both at the time the contracts were executed and at the time he received the payment.[21]  Snyder offered an explanation: he had been providing consulting services to Peterbilt, and the check was his fee for that work.[22]  The federal government then charged Snyder with accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666.[23]  A jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to one year and nine months in federal prison.[24]

B.  The Facts, as the Record Reflects

Justice Jackson’s dissent supplies the factual context the majority omits. Snyder took office as mayor of Portage in January 2012.[25]  In that capacity, Snyder and his appointees controlled the Portage Board of Works and Public Safety, the entity responsible for the city’s public bidding process.[26]  Snyder installed a personal friend, Randy Reeder, to manage that process, despite Reeder’s complete lack of relevant experience.[27]  Evidence at trial established that Reeder did not run a neutral bidding process.[28]  Instead, he tailored the technical specifications for two separate city contracts to favor Peterbilt, which was owned by two brothers, Robert and Stephen Buha.[29]

The first contract arose from Snyder’s campaign pledge to automate trash collection.[30]  By late 2012, the city was seeking to purchase three garbage trucks.[31]  When the Board of Works issued the invitation to bid, Reeder had crafted the specifications, including a requirement that trucks be delivered within 150 days, knowing those terms would favor Peterbilt and disadvantage competitors.[32]  Evidence showed that the city could have saved approximately $60,000 had it not prioritized expedited delivery.[33]  Evidence also showed that during the bidding period, Snyder was in direct contact with the Buha brothers while remaining out of contact with any other bidder.[34]  Ultimately, the Board of Works awarded Peterbilt the contract.[35]

A second contract followed in late 2013.[36]  Peterbilt had a 2012 model truck sitting unsold on its lot for two years.[37]  Snyder first tried to buy the truck outright, but the city attorney informed him that he must go through the public bidding process.[38]  Again, Reeder adjusted the bid specifications to favor Peterbilt, this time specifically to help it move the aging inventory.[39]  The Board of Works awarded Peterbilt this contract as well.[40]  Taken together, the contracts totaled $1.125 million in city funds directed to Peterbilt.[41]

Shortly after the second contract was awarded, Snyder drove to the Peterbilt dealership and told the Buha brothers, in straightforward terms, “I need money.”[42]  He asked for $15,000, and they gave him $13,000.[43]  When federal investigators later inquired about the payment, Snyder gave differing accounts to multiple people.[44]  To investigators, he claimed the money was for consulting services.[45]  To Reeder and another city employee, he told different stories.[46]  At trial, Peterbilt employees testified that Snyder had never performed any consulting work and no documentation of any such work was ever produced.[47]  Peterbilt’s own controller testified that Snyder had been paid, in her words, “for an inside track.”[48]

A federal grand jury indicted Snyder on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), which makes it a crime to “corruptly solicit[] or demand[] . . . or accept[] or agree[] to accept, anything of value  . . . intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection [with a government transaction].”[49]  A jury convicted him, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.[50]  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether § 666 reaches post hoc gratuities paid to state and local officials.[51]  Ultimately, in a six-to-three decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court reversed Snyder’s conviction, holding that § 666 prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes but does not extend to cover gratuities.[52]

III.  Legal Background

This Part provides the legal and doctrinal context necessary to understand Snyder’s significance.  It first outlines the core federal public corruption statutes, focusing on the distinction between bribery and gratuities as reflected in § 201, § 1346, and § 666.  It then traces the Supreme Court’s broader pattern of narrowing federal anti-corruption law over the past four decades, emphasizing the Court’s recurring reliance on textualism, federalism concerns, and the rule of lenity to limit prosecutorial reach.  Finally, it explains the pre-Snyder circuit split over whether § 666 covers post hoc gratuities, the dispute the Court granted certiorari in Snyder to resolve, and why that interpretive conflict mattered for federal enforcement of state and local corruption.

A.  The Federal Anti-Corruption Framework

Federal law addresses public corruption through several overlapping criminal statutes.  The oldest and most comprehensive is 18 U.S.C. § 201, which prohibits bribery of and illegal gratuities to any “public official,” a term the Supreme Court has construed to reach anyone who occupies a position of public trust with official federal responsibilities.[53]  Section 201 contains two distinct crimes in adjacent subsections: § 201(b) prohibits bribes, defined as payments made with the intent to influence an official act, while § 201(c) prohibits gratuities, defined as payments made “for or because of” an official act.[54]

Congress enacted § 666 in 1984 to address a perceived gap in the federal anti-corruption scheme.[55]  When lower courts split over whether state officials could be deemed “public officials” under § 201, Congress proactively enacted § 666.[56]  Section 666 applies to agents of state and local governments that receive more than $10,000 in federal benefits in a given year, a threshold that, in practice, encompasses virtually every county, municipality, and school district in the country.  By its terms, § 666 prohibits covered state and local officials from “corruptly” soliciting, demanding, or accepting anything of value “intending to be influenced or rewarded” in connection with a government transaction involving $5,000 or more.[57]

A third pillar of the federal anti-corruption framework is the honest services fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which defines “scheme or artifice to defraud” for purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes to include a scheme to deprive citizens of the “intangible right of honest services.”[58]  Congress enacted this provision in 1988 as a direct legislative response to the Supreme Court’s widely criticized decision in McNally v. United States, which narrowed the reach of the mail fraud statute so sharply that Congress moved almost immediately to override it.[59]  Section 1346 operates primarily in the political corruption context, reaching officials who accept bribes or kickbacks in exchange for the corrupt exercise of their official duties.[60]  As subsequently interpreted in Skilling v. United States, § 1346’s reach has been confined to those categories of conduct, leaving undisclosed conflicts of interest and other forms of self-dealing beyond its scope.[61]

B.  A Historical Pattern of Retrenchment

The Supreme Court’s treatment of federal anti-corruption statutes over the past four decades has followed a consistent trajectory of contraction.  Case by case, the Court has resolved textual ambiguities in favor of defendants, frequently invoking federalism concerns, fair notice, or the rule of lenity.  The cumulative result is a federal anti-corruption framework marked by expanding gaps that the Court’s own decisions have made increasingly difficult for Congress to close.

The pattern begins with McNally v. United States, decided in 1987.[62]  McNally arose from a Kentucky scheme in which state officials steered public insurance contracts to companies in which they had a financial interest in exchange for kickbacks.[63]  The government charged the officials with violations of the mail fraud statute, contending that they had deprived Kentucky citizens of their intangible right to honest government.[64]  A jury convicted McNally on the mail fraud count and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.[65]  The Court rejected the government’s theory in a seven-to-two decision, holding that the mail fraud statute extended only to schemes that deprive victims of money or property, not intangible interests such as honest government.[66]  That decision swept away decades of lower-court precedent and effectively immunized a broad category of self-dealing by public officials from federal prosecution.[67]  Congress responded the following year by enacting § 1346, which restored honest services fraud as a viable prosecutorial theory.[68]

Congress’s response proved only provisional.  In Skilling v. United States, decided in 2010, the Court confronted the breadth of § 1346 and held that § 1346 reaches only bribery and kickback schemes, reasoning that any broader reading would render the statute unconstitutionally vague.[69]  Undisclosed conflicts of interest, favoritism, and self-dealing fell beyond the statute’s permissible reach, even when thoroughly corrupt in the lay sense of that term.[70]  Skilling did not directly undermine prosecutions involving explicit quid pro quos, but it established a template that subsequent decisions would follow: when a federal anti-corruption statute reaches broadly, the Court will construe it narrowly.

In McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court applied that template to the bribery statute’s own definition of “official act.”[71]  Former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell had accepted approximately $175,000 in loans, vacations, and gifts from a pharmaceutical executive who wanted the Governor to promote his company’s dietary supplement within the Virginia state government.[72]  McDonnell arranged meetings, hosted events, and made calls to state officials on the executive’s behalf.[73]  A unanimous Supreme Court vacated his conviction, holding that merely arranging meetings, making calls, or hosting events did not constitute “official acts” within the meaning of § 201(a)(3).[74]  An official act, the Court held, requires a decision or action on a specific matter involving a formal exercise of governmental power, such as a lawsuit, an agency determination, a legislative hearing, or the use of an official position to pressure or advise another official to take such action.[75]  In practice, the decision established a high and formalistic threshold for what counts as a bribe, creating substantial room for transactional relationships between officials and donors that fall just short of the Court’s definition.

Kelly v. United States,[76] decided unanimously in 2020, closed yet another avenue of prosecution.  The case arose from the Bridgegate scandal, in which allies of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie deliberately caused gridlock on the George Washington Bridge by reassigning access lanes to punish a political adversary.[77]  The government charged the scheme as wire fraud and as fraud on a federally funded program under § 666(a)(1)(A), arguing that the defendants had obtained the Port Authority’s property, including the lanes themselves and the time and labor of the employees who carried out the realignment.[78]  The Court reversed, holding that the object of the scheme was not to obtain property but to exercise regulatory power for political ends.[79]   Because the federal fraud statutes require that the defendant seek to obtain money or property from the victim, the mere misuse of governmental authority, however corrupt the motive, falls outside their reach.[80]  The lane manipulations deprived New Jersey commuters of safe and efficient access to the bridge, but that deprivation was a regulatory harm, not a property deprivation cognizable under the wire fraud statute.[81]  Once again, the Court identified a gap between conduct that constituted a clear abuse of official power and conduct that federal law actually prohibited.[82]

C.  Section 666 Before Snyder

Against this backdrop of successive doctrinal retreats, § 666 remained an important prosecutorial tool for federal enforcement of state and local corruption.  Its broad reach, which extended to corruption in connection with any federally funded program or entity, made it the statute of choice when a § 201 prosecution was unavailable or when the conduct fell short of the formal requirements that McDonnell and Skilling had imposed on other provisions.[83]

The question of whether § 666 covered post hoc gratuities had divided the federal circuits for years before Snyder.  The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits held that § 666’s text, prohibiting officials from accepting things of value “intending to be influenced or rewarded,” reached both bribes and gratuities.[84]  On this reading, the word “rewarded” did the operative work of extending coverage to post hoc payments; a reward, by ordinary definition, is something given in recognition of past conduct.[85]  The First and Fifth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion, holding that § 666 reached only bribes, meaning payments made as part of a prior agreement to influence an official act.[86]  The circuit split was well-developed and openly acknowledged; both sides recognized the competing textual arguments and reached different conclusions from the same statutory language.  That clean divide made Supreme Court resolution, and a definitive construction of § 666, both inevitable and consequential.

IV.  Instant Decision

Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion rests on six independent grounds, each of which, the Court says, points toward the same conclusion: that § 666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute.[87]  The breadth of the majority’s reasoning, which spans text, history, structure, punishment, federalism, and fair notice, suggests an awareness that no single ground is airtight and that the argument is most persuasive in the aggregate.[88]  The dissent, authored by Justice Jackson and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, makes a compelling case that the aggregate is no stronger than its weakest links.

A.  The Majority Opinion

The majority begins with the text. Section 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime to “corruptly” accept a payment “intending to be influenced or rewarded” in connection with covered government business or transactions.[89]  The majority notes that some of this language tracks § 201(b), the federal bribery provision, which similarly requires that the official act “corruptly” and with the intent to be “influenced.”[90]  The federal gratuities provision, § 201(c), uses entirely different language.[91]  It simply prohibits accepting a payment “for or because of” an official act, with no requirement of corrupt intent.[92]  Because § 666 uses the bribery formulation rather than the gratuities formulation, the majority concludes, it covers only the former.[93]

On statutory history, the majority emphasizes the significance of the 1986 amendment.[94] When Congress originally enacted § 666 in 1984, it borrowed language from § 201(c), the gratuities provision.[95]  When § 666 was amended two years later, it replaced some of that language with text resembling § 201(b), the bribery provision.[96]  To the majority, this was dispositive; Congress made a deliberate, textually explicit choice to move from a gratuities framework to a bribery framework, and the Court should honor that choice.[97]

The structural argument focuses on how Congress has historically treated bribery and gratuities as two separate crimes with distinct sets of elements.[98]  Statutes that prohibit both, such as § 201 itself, house them in separate subsections with separate penalty provisions.[99]  If Congress had intended § 666 to cover both bribes and gratuities in a single provision, the majority argues, it would have explicitly said so.[100]

On punishment, the majority points to an “anomaly” that would result from the government’s reading.[101]  Section 666 provides a maximum sentence of ten years for any violation.[102]  If § 666 covers both bribes and gratuities, then a state official who accepts a modest thank-you gift after voting on a contract would face the same ten-year maximum as one who solicited a six-figure bribe in exchange for rigging a procurement process.[103]  Congress, the majority observes, treats bribery and gratuity offenses differently at the federal level precisely because they are different in kind.[104]  The Court concluded that it was implausible that Congress would collapse that distinction for state and local officials.[105]

The federalism argument is perhaps the majority’s most ambitious.[106]  States and localities have developed their own, varied regulatory regimes for official gratuities, with some imposing threshold limits, some distinguishing between types of gifts, and some treating violations as misdemeanors rather than felonies.[107]  The majority contends that reading § 666 to federalize gratuities enforcement would displace these calibrated state-level judgments and subject approximately nineteen million state and local officials to a new federal standard without clear guidance.[108]  The states’ prerogative to regulate the relationship between their officials and their constituents, the majority argues, counsels against an interpretation that overrides that prerogative sub silentio.[109]

Finally, the majority invokes fair notice.[110]  If § 666 covers all gratuities, neither the government nor the courts can coherently explain which ones are criminal and which are not.[111] The majority conjures the problem with a series of examples: a holiday tip for the mail carrier,  an end-of-year gift basket for a public school teacher, a gift card for a trash collector, and a bottle of wine from a neighbor.[112] If § 666 criminalizes these, it is absurdly overbroad; if it does not, prosecutors must draw lines that have no textual basis.[113]  The majority concludes that Congress would not have authorized a ten-year maximum sentence for an offense it failed to define with any coherent limiting principle.[114]

The majority also directly addresses the textual argument that gives the dissent most of its force: the use of the term “rewarded.”[115]  The government argued that “rewarded” extends § 666’s coverage beyond bribes to post hoc payments, because a reward is by definition something given after the fact.[116]  The majority disagrees, determining that the word “rewarded” in § 666 functions not to expand coverage to gratuities, but to close off a defense that might otherwise be available to a defendant charged with bribery.[117]  Without “rewarded,” a bribe-taker might argue that the payment was received only after the official act and, therefore, could not have “influenced” the act.[118]  Or he might argue that he would have taken the same act anyway and, therefore, he was not “influenced” by the payment.[119]  The word “rewarded” forecloses that defense while leaving the bribery framework intact.[120]

B.  The Gorsuch Concurrence

Justice Gorsuch joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to emphasize the rule of lenity.[121]  Writing briefly, he argued that the rule of lenity—the canon of construction requiring that ambiguous criminal statutes be resolved in favor of defendants—was the principle actually at work behind the Court’s decision.[122]  In his view, the majority’s grounds taken together would leave any fair reader with a reasonable doubt about whether § 666 reaches the charged conduct, and that doubt must be resolved in the defendant’s favor.[123]  The concurrence is notable less for its reasoning than for what it signals: at least one justice in the majority understood the decision to rest not on clear text, but on genuine doubt about what the statute means.

C.  The Jackson Dissent

Justice Jackson’s dissent begins and ends with the word “rewarded.”  In her view, the majority’s effort to neutralize that word is the opinion’s fatal flaw, and every other argument the majority invokes is built on the foundation of that error.[124]  “Rewarded” means what it ordinarily means: a payment given in recognition of past conduct.[125]  That is the definition of a gratuity. The statute says officials cannot “corruptly” accept things of value “intending to be . . . rewarded” for official acts.[126]  That is, on the dissent’s reading, a plain-text prohibition on corrupt gratuities.[127]  The majority’s effort to confine “rewarded” to closing off a narrow bribery defense is, the dissent argues, rank speculation about legislative purpose in the face of clear text.[128]

The dissent further supports its textual reading by pointing to Congress’s usage of “reward” elsewhere in the U.S. Code.[129]  When Congress criminalizes gratuities, it uses the word “reward.”[130]  The pattern is consistent across multiple statutes.[131]  The majority’s claim that § 666 uses the word in a different, narrower sense requires evidence of congressional intent to deviate from ordinary usage, and the majority cannot supply that evidence.[132]

When examining statutory and legislative history, the dissent argues that the majority’s account of the 1986 amendment is incomplete.[133]  Section 666 traces its lineage to 18 U.S.C. § 201, which “contains comprehensive prohibitions on bribes and gratuities to federal officials.”[134]  But initially, it was not entirely clear which officials were covered under the statute.[135]  Section 201 broadly applied to “public officials,”[136] which led to confusion among lower courts as to whether state and local employees could be considered “public officials” under the statute.[137]  Without awaiting the Supreme Court’s resolution of that question, Congress enacted § 666 in 1984.[138]  Congress expressly sought to reach state and local officials to “protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs.”[139]  As enacted, § 666 barred those officials from accepting “anything of value . . . for or because of the recipient’s conduct,”[140] using similar language to § 201(c), the federal gratuities provision.[141]  No one disputes that, as originally enacted, § 666 prohibited both bribes and gratuities.[142]  Additionally, Congress imposed the same ten-year maximum term of imprisonment for a violation then as it does now.[143]  This went unmentioned by the majority.[144]

Starting from that historical disadvantage, the dissent reasoned, the majority needed to show that Congress made major changes to § 666 that could account for the “sans-gratuity interpretation” the majority adopted.[145]  The dissent found no such changes.  First, Congress itself described the 1986 revisions as “technical and minor.”[146]  As relevant here, Congress added a “corruptly” mens rea requirement and swapped the previous “for or because of” language for the current “intending to be influenced or rewarded” phrasing.[147]  Nonetheless, the majority argued that Congress fashioned § 666 after the federal-official bribery provision, § 201(b).[148]  However, the dissent finds a different progenitor, 18 U.S.C. § 215.[149]  That provision imposes criminal penalties on any bank employee who “corruptly solicits or demands . . . or corruptly accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business or transaction.”[150]  The majority dismissed § 215 as “a null data point” because the Supreme Court has never interpreted it.[151]  The dissent responded with evidence that Congress understood § 215 to criminalize gratuities, citing a House Report that described the pre-1986 statute as reaching “any gratuity, no matter how trivial.”[152]  Then, in 1986, Congress amended § 215 to narrow the statute, but not by carving out gratuities altogether.[153]  Instead, it narrowed the law “by requiring that the acceptance of the gratuity be done corruptly.”[154]  This is the exact same edit Congress made to § 666.[155]

Finally, the dissent’s most constructive contribution is its argument that § 666 already contains the tools to distinguish criminal gratuities from innocent ones.[156]  The statute’s requirement of corrupt intent, its connection to a specific government transaction, and its requirement that the transaction involve $5,000 or more collectively exclude the teacher’s gift basket, the neighbor’s bottle of wine, and the other examples the majority worries about.[157]  The majority’s parade of horribles, the dissent argues, is a problem the statute has already solved, if only the Court would let the statute do its work.[158]  And whatever the precise contours of “corruptly” as a limiting principle, the dissent notes, James Snyder’s conduct, including the rigged specifications, the solicitation, and the shifting explanations to investigators, clearly satisfies any reasonable definition of it.[159]

V.  Comment

This Part develops three related arguments and then turns to their consequences.  Part A argues that the majority’s treatment of the word “rewarded” is textually indefensible and that its structural and historical arguments fare no better on close examination.  Part B situates Snyder within the broader pattern of Supreme Court retrenchment, arguing that the decision is best understood not as an isolated interpretive dispute but as the latest step in a decades-long practice of resolving ambiguity in the anti-corruption context in a single consistent direction.  Part C addresses the majority’s federalism argument specifically, contending that invoking federalism to limit a statute that was enacted precisely to regulate state and local officials is circular.  Parts D and E turn to consequences: the structural enforcement gap Snyder has created, why alternative prosecutorial theories cannot reliably fill it, and the limits of a congressional response given the interpretive groundwork the majority has laid.

A.  The Majority’s Methodology

Public corruption rarely announces itself in terms the law can easily condemn.  It often operates in a gray zone, through relationships cultivated over time, payments structured to be plausibly explained, and conduct calibrated to stay just short of what courts have said the statutes reach.  What makes Snyder v. United States so consequential is not that it resolved a close case, but that it confronted conduct that was plainly corrupt, not merely questionable, and still found the defendant on the right side of the legal line. The record in Snyder contains evidence of rigged bid specifications, personal solicitation of funds, inconsistent stories to investigators, and trial testimony that Snyder had been paid “for an inside track.”[160]  A jury convicted him.[161] Nevertheless, the Court reversed.[162]  The gap between Snyder’s conduct and what the law could reach is not incidental to the case. It is the case.  And that gap is the product not of congressional design, but of successive judicial choices about where the law’s reach should end.

The majority’s treatment of the word “rewarded” is the opinion’s most vulnerable passage. The dissent’s textual argument is straightforward.  “Rewarded” means what it ordinarily means, which is recognition of past conduct.[163]  Congress uses the word in that sense across the U.S. Code, including in statutes that even Snyder conceded cover gratuities.[164]  To assign the word the narrower function of closing off a bribery defense that defendants rarely invoke requires a departure from ordinary meaning that the majority cannot support with evidence of congressional intent.  The majority’s reading also renders “rewarded” surplusage within the statute; if “influenced” already captures the corrupt quid pro quo that defines bribery, “rewarded” adds nothing little beyond the narrow, defense-foreclosing role the majority assigns it.  The canon against surplusage therefore cuts against the majority’s interpretation, yet the majority declines to acknowledge the tension.[165]

The majority’s structural argument that Congress has historically separated bribery and gratuities into distinct subsections with separate penalties misapprehends the purpose that § 666 was enacted to serve.  Section 201 addresses federal officials through separate provisions because Congress drafted it as a comprehensive scheme housing multiple related offenses. Section 666, by contrast, was enacted in a single provision specifically to address the perceived gap in federal coverage of state and local officials.[166]  The absence of a separate gratuities subsection in § 666 is equally consistent with the reading that Congress chose to cover both offenses in a single, unified provision.  The original 1984 version of the statute, which no one disputes covered gratuities, did exactly that.  In effect, the majority reads § 666 through the structure of a different statute, a move the dissent correctly rejects. That move is analytically unsound because § 201’s separate subsections reflect how Congress organized one comprehensive code of conduct for federal officials; they say nothing about whether Congress, drafting a single targeted provision for a different class of officials, intended that provision to reach one offense or both.

The amendment history that the majority treats as dispositive, when read carefully and in full, provides at least as much support for the dissent’s position as for the majority’s.  The two opinions each rely on a different sentence in the 1986 legislative record.  The first is Congress’s own characterization of the changes to § 666 as “technical and minor.”[167]  The second is the report’s stated concern about the statute’s “possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.”[168]  But only one of these opinions is consistent with reading both, taken together.  The broad “for or because of” language used in the federal gratuities provisions might well be read to cover even what the majority considers “innocuous” gifts.  Congress, recognizing this, did not intend to legalize all gratuities through the 1986 amendment, but instead sought to make “technical and minor” changes while also preventing § 666 from reaching “acceptable commercial and business practices.”[169]  Hence, Congress added a “corruptly” mens rea requirement and prohibited payments “intending to be . . . rewarded.”[170]  A payment of $13,000 solicited directly by a mayor shortly after he directed over a million dollars in public contracts to the payor, and accompanied by inconsistent explanations to investigators and trial testimony that it was paid “for an inside track,” is not genuinely innocuous conduct.  It satisfies any reasonable definition of “corruptly” regardless of whether a prior agreement can be proven.  The majority’s reading protects it anyway, not because the amendment history requires that result, but because the majority has interpreted the historical record to require it.

B.  Snyder as the Latest Step in a Pattern of Retrenchment

Snyder v. United States is not an outlier.  It is the most recent instance of a pattern in which the Supreme Court, when confronted with conduct that looks corrupt but does not fit neatly within established legal categories, has resolved the ambiguity by drawing the legal category more narrowly.  In doing so, the Court has expanded the gray zone between what is obviously corrupt and what federal law can actually reach.

The gray zone has always existed.  Corruption between public officials and private actors rarely takes the form of a written quid pro quo.  It operates instead through accumulated favors, understood expectations, and transactions designed to appear innocent upon examination.  The law’s task is to draw a line between that ambient relational corruption, which the political process must address, and the kind of transactional corruption that federal criminal law can coherently prohibit.  What the Court’s recent anti-corruption decisions have done, case by case, is move that line in a single direction, steadily expanding the space in which conduct can look corrupt to any reasonable observer while remaining beyond the law’s reach.

Each step in the sequence has worked the same way.  The Court identifies a formal distinction, such as the line between property and honest services, between bribery and mere facilitation, between regulatory power and property, or between bribery and a post hoc gratuity, and places one side of that distinction beyond the statute’s reach.  The distinction is always defensible in the abstract.  The problem is not that any single line is incoherent; it is that each successive line is drawn in the same direction, and what accumulates on the legally protected side is a substantial and growing inventory of conduct that is corrupt in every meaningful sense of the word.  A governor who accepts six figures in gifts and loans and then arranges meetings, hosts events, and contacts other officials on the giver’s behalf but stops short of making—or pressuring others to make—a formal government decision is protected by McDonnell.[171]  A mayor who rigs public contracts and then solicits payment after the fact but cannot be proven to have struck a prior agreement is now protected by Snyder.[172]  The gray zone has not grown because public corruption has become more ambiguous.  It has grown because the Court has chosen, consistently and across decades, to treat ambiguity as a reason to narrow the law.

C.  Undermining the Federalism Argument

The majority’s federalism argument deserves closer scrutiny than its surface plausibility suggests.  The argument runs: states have developed their own gift-giving and anti-corruption regimes; § 666 read to cover gratuities would displace those regimes with a uniform federal standard applied to approximately nineteen million state and local officials; and Congress should not be presumed to have made so significant a displacement sub silentio.[173]  This reasoning contains a tension the majority does not resolve. Congress enacted § 666 specifically to apply to state and local officials precisely because it determined that federal funds distributed through those governments require federal protection.  The intrusion on state and local governance that the majority invokes as a reason to narrow the statute is therefore not an unintended side effect of § 666; it is the statute’s purpose.   Invoking federalism to limit a statute that is federalism-engaging by design is circular.

The constitutional basis for § 666’s application to state officials is well-established.  In Sabri v. United States, the Supreme Court held that § 666 falls within Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause authority to protect against corruption in entities receiving federal funds.[174]  The Court in Sabri recognized that Congress need not trace each corrupt act to a specific federal dollar in order to protect the integrity of federal funding streams: corruption in one program of a federally funded entity undermines the integrity of all programs that entity administers.[175]  That rationale supports § 666’s broad scope, and it does not diminish simply because the corrupt payment is post hoc rather than in advance.

The majority’s concern about chilling legitimate gift-giving by state officials also overstates the problem.  The dissent correctly identifies the filtering mechanisms already embedded in § 666’s text: the statute requires corrupt intent, a nexus to a specific government transaction, and a transaction involving $5,000 or more.[176]  These requirements collectively exclude the paradigmatic cases the majority invokes, such as the holiday tip, the teacher’s gift basket, and the neighbor’s bottle of wine, without requiring the Court to excise entire categories of corrupt conduct from the statute’s reach.  By treating the statute’s built-in limiting principles as insufficient and manufacturing additional narrowing from the bribery-gratuity distinction, the majority has done considerably more than the fair notice concern it identifies could justify.

D.  Practical Consequences: An Enforcement Gap with No Ready Solution

The practical consequences of Snyder extend well beyond James Snyder’s case.  By removing post hoc gratuities from § 666’s scope, the Court has created a category of state and local corruption that is now substantially more difficult to prosecute under federal law.  An official who solicits payment after awarding a contract, rather than before it, now operates in a space that § 666 cannot reach.  The distinction between a bribe and a gratuity, which often turns on timing and the presence or absence of a prior agreement, is precisely the kind of distinction that sophisticated officials and their advisors can exploit.[177]

Federal prosecutors in post-Snyder cases must now rely on alternative theories with their own doctrinal limitations.  Honest services fraud under § 1346 remains available only where the conduct constitutes a bribe or kickback—conduct that § 666 still reaches after Snyder—which leaves honest services fraud of little use against the post hoc gratuities that Snyder removed from § 666.[178]  The Hobbs Act reaches extortion under color of official right but requires the government to prove an implicit quid pro quo, meaning that the official accepted payment with the understanding it was given in exchange for official action.[179]  Where an official presents himself as a passive recipient of an unsolicited payment, Hobbs Act liability may not attach.  Additionally, state anti-corruption statutes vary widely in scope and enforcement, and in many jurisdictions, they do not reliably fill the gap that Snyder has opened.

The result is a structural enforcement gap whose costs are not evenly distributed.  Federal law has historically served as a backstop where state prosecutorial resources are thin, state officials are insulated from accountability by local politics, or corruption is too entrenched for state enforcement to address effectively.[180]  By narrowing § 666’s reach, the Court has made that backstop less available precisely in the contexts where federal intervention has the most practical consequence.  The costs of the Snyder majority’s interpretive choices fall on communities that depend on federal funds to deliver basic services, while the benefits flow to officials who have learned to exploit the gap the Court has created.

E.  The Path Forward: Congressional Response and Its Structural Limits

The most direct response to Snyder is a congressional amendment expressly extending § 666’s coverage to post hoc gratuities.  Structurally, such an amendment would need to do what the Snyder majority said the current text does not: clearly and explicitly prohibit state and local officials from accepting payments made in recognition of, or as a reward for, official acts. Modeled on § 201(c)’s language, a corrective statute might prohibit officials from “corruptly” accepting anything of value “for or because of” official conduct, while retaining § 666’s existing limiting principles, namely the $5,000 transaction threshold, the government-transaction nexus, and the corrupt-intent requirement, which already distinguish criminal gratuities from ordinary gift-giving.[181]

The structural challenge is that the Snyder majority has already laid interpretive groundwork that could be used to resist such a correction.  By treating the 1986 amendment as a deliberate congressional choice to move from a gratuities framework to a bribery framework, the majority has constructed a legislative history in which Congress considered and rejected the broad, gratuity-covering formulation.  A subsequent amendment reinstating that language would need to overcome the inference, familiar from the Court’s treatment of congressional overrides, that it represents a substantive change rather than a restoration.  The more Congress specifies, the more opportunities the Court has to identify gaps; the more broadly Congress drafts, the more vulnerable the statute is to vagueness and fair notice challenges of the kind the majority invoked in Snyder itself.

VI. Conclusion

Ultimately, Snyder v. United States raises questions that go beyond the proper construction of 18 U.S.C. § 666.  The decision is the product of an interpretive methodology that consistently resolves ambiguity against the government in the anti-corruption context and consistently treats federalism and fair notice as near-dispositive concerns even where Congress has clearly chosen to regulate.  That methodology is not neutral: it embeds a substantive policy preference for narrow federal oversight of state and local corruption, and it imposes the consequences of that preference on the communities that federal anti-corruption law was designed to protect.  Snyder’s most important legacy may be not what it decides, but what it exemplifies: a Court that has rendered the federal anti-corruption framework markedly less capable of addressing the corruption it was built to address, one interpretive choice at a time.

*B.A. University of Missouri, 2024; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2027; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2025–2026; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2026–2027.  I am grateful to Professor Jayne Woods for her insight, guidance, and support during the drafting of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.

[1] Public Trust in Government: 1958–2025, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Dec. 4, 2025), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/.

[2] Id.

[3] The State of Public Trust in Government 2024, P’ship for Pub. Serv. (June 10, 2024), https://ourpublicservice.org/publications/state-of-trust-in-government-2024/.

[4] 18 U.S.C. § 201.

[5] Id. § 1346

[6] Id. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right”).

[7] Id. § 666.

[8] Modest Increase in Official Corruption Convictions in 2023, Transactional Recs. Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) (Jan. 31, 2024), https://tracreports.org/reports/737/; see also David Kwok, Trends in Prosecution of Federal and State Public Corruption, 2 Stetson Bus. L. Rev. 30, 53–57 (2022).

[9] See generally Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024).

[10] See generally McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016); Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391 (2020).  The Court’s narrow conception of cognizable corruption is not confined to the criminal law context.  See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court held that independent campaign expenditures cannot be restricted on anti-corruption grounds because without prearrangement or coordination with a candidate, they cannot give rise to a quid pro quo.  Id. at 357.  The majority went further, stating expressly that the anti-corruption interest recognized in Buckley v. Valeo “was limited to quid pro quo corruption” and that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”  Id. at 359–60.  Scholars have argued that this narrow conception operates in parallel with the narrowing trend in criminal anti-corruption doctrine.  See George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption: With a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 177, 177–78 (2015); Ofer Raban, Constitutionalizing Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of Political Corruption, and the Implications for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 359, 364–65 (2010).  The public has consistently rejected the Court’s framing: a 2025 YouGov survey found that 63% of Americans disagreed with the decision, and 79% agreed that large independent expenditures by wealthy donors give rise to corruption or its appearance.  Georgia Lyon, New polling illuminates how the Supreme Court got Citizens United wrong and shows bipartisan momentum for money-in-politics reforms, including proposed Montana ballot measure, Issue One (Oct. 28, 2025), https://issueone.org/press/new-polling-citizens-united-money-in-politics-reforms/.

[11] See McNally, 483 U.S. at 359–60.

[12] See McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 574.

[13] See Kelly, 590 U.S. at 400–01.

[14] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 15–16.

[15] Id. at 9–10; id. at 32–34 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[16] Id. at 9.

[17] Id. at 32–34 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[18] Id. at 9.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 9–10.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 32 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 32–33 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Specifically, “Reeder ‘based the chassis specifications on a Peterbilt chassis’” and declined equipment demonstrations offered by other prospective suppliers.  Brief for the United States at 9, Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024) (No. 23-108).

[30] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 33 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id. at 34.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[50] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 34 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[51] Id. at 10.

[52] Id. at 5.

[53] 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1); Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984) (finding the proper inquiry of who classifies as a public official to be “whether the person occupies a position of public trust with official federal responsibilities”).

[54] 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)–(c).

[55] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[56] Id.

[57] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[58] Id. § 1346.

[59] McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (holding that the mail fraud statute is “limited in scope to the protection of property rights” and cannot reach intangible deprivations of honest government service); 18 U.S.C. § 1346.

[60] Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 409 (2010).

[61] Id.

[62] McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).

[63] Id. at 352–53.

[64] Id. at 354–55.

[65] Id.  The intermediate court “relied on a line of decisions from the Courts of Appeals holding that the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government.”  Id. at 355.

[66] Id. at 356.

[67] See id. at 375–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s holding as a “casual—almost summary—rejection of the accumulated wisdom of the many distinguished federal judges who have thoughtfully considered and correctly answered the question these cases present” and noting that “a series of Court of Appeals’ opinions applying this very statute to schemes to defraud a State and its citizens of their intangible right to honest and faithful government . . . removed any relevant ambiguity in this statute”); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 401 (2010) (acknowledging that McNally “halted” the lower courts’ decades-long practice of applying the federal fraud statutes to protect intangible interests unconnected to traditional property rights).

[68] Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).  Congress acted to restore the “intangible rights doctrine” by reinstating the pre-McNally case law.  See 134 Cong. Rec. S12581-04 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).

[69] Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404–09.  The Court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance to narrow § 1346, reasoning that a broader construction would render the statute unconstitutionally vague for failure to provide fair notice of what conduct it prohibits.  Id. at 402–04.

[70] Id. at 409–10.

[71] McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016).

[72] Id. at 556–57, 561.

[73] Id. at 557–59, 561.

[74] Id. at 567.

[75] Id. at 572–74.  The Court explained that a qualifying “official act” must involve a formal exercise of governmental power similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee, and that setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event does not qualify without more.  Id.

[76] Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. 391 (2020).

[77] Id. at 393–95.

[78] Id. at 393–94.

[79] Id. at 403.

[80] Id. at 402.

[81] See id. at 393, 401.

[82] Id. at 393 (“The evidence the jury heard no doubt shows wrongdoing—deception, corruption, abuse of power. But the federal fraud statutes at issue do not criminalize all such conduct.”).  For more discussion on the Supreme Court’s narrowing of public corruption cases, see Yuvraj Tuli & Mohamed Arafa, From McDonnell to Snyder: The Supreme Court’s Public Corruption Cases and the Coming Narrowing of White Collar and FCPA Enforcement, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Aug. 13, 2025), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/from-mcdonnell-to-snyder-the-supreme-courts-public-corruption-cases-and-the-coming-narrowing-of-white-collar-and-fcpa-enforcement-by-yuvraj-tuli-mohamed-arafa/; and Ben Seitelman & Bradley Coffey, How a Supreme Court Decision Changed Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions (Why State and Local Laws Matter), MultiState: Insider (Jan. 7, 2026), https://www.multistate.us/insider/2026/1/7/how-a-supreme-court-decision-changed-federal-public-corruption-prosecutions-why-state-and-local-laws-matter.

[83] See Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2024); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004) (describing § 666’s role in protecting federal funds from “local administrators” who might steal or otherwise misuse them).

[84] See, e.g., United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520–22 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024); United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 578–80 (7th Cir. 2023), rev’d, 603 U.S. 1 (2024); United States v. Zimmermann, 509 F.3d 920, 926–27 (8th Cir. 2007), abrogated by Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024); United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024).

[85] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (defining a “reward” as “[t]hat which is given in return for good or evil done or received” (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2136 (2d ed. 1957))); United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 579 (7th Cir. 2023) (“The statutory language ‘influenced or rewarded’ easily reaches both bribes and gratuities.”), rev’d, 603 U.S. 1 (2024).

[86] United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2022).  The Supreme Court expressly granted certiorari to resolve the split.  Snyder, 603 U.S. at 10.

[87] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 10.

[88] See id.

[89] Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[90] Snyder, 603 U.S.  at 10–11; 18 U.S.C. § 201(b).

[91] 18 U.S.C. § 201(c).

[92] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 11; 18 U.S.C. § 201(c).

[93] Snyder, 603 U.S.  at 12.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II).

[96] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 12; 18 U.S.C. § 201(b); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[97] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 12.

[98] Id. at 12–13.

[99] Id. at 13; 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)–(c).

[100] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 13.

[101] Id. at 13–14.

[102]Id. at 13; 18 U.S.C. § 666(a).

[103] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 13 (observing that, under the government’s reading, Congress “would have authorized the same 10-year maximum sentences for (i) gratuities to state and local officials and (ii) bribes to state and local officials”); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a).

[104] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 13 (explaining that bribery and gratuities “receive different punishments that ‘reflect their relative seriousness’” (quoting United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 405 (1999))).  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (fifteen-year maximum for bribery), with 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (two-year maximum for illegal gratuities).

[105] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 13–14.

[106] See id. at 14–15.

[107] Id. at 6–7.

[108] Id. at 14.

[109] See id at 14–15.

[110] Id. at 15.

[111] Id. at 15–16.

[112] Id. at 6, 16.

[113] Id. at 15–16.

[114] Id. at 17.

[115] Id. at 18.

[116] See id.

[117] Id. at 18–19.

[118] Id.

[119] Id. at 19.

[120] Id.

[121] Id. at 20–21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

[122] Id.

[123] See id. at 20.

[124] See id. at 24–26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[125] Id. at 25.

[126] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[127] See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[128] Id. at 26 (“[T]he majority must strain to make the word ‘rewarded’ . . . relevant, rather than meaningless.  It offers rank speculation as to why ‘rewarded’ in § 666 might mean something other than what it ordinarily does, ultimately assigning the word some busy work relating to potential defenses to bribery charges.”).

[129] Id.at 26–27.

[130] Id. at 26; 18 U.S.C. § 1912; 22 U.S.C. § 4202.

[131] 18 U.S.C. § 1912; 22 U.S.C. § 4202.

[132] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[133]Id. at 28–30.  The dissent further added that resorting to statutory history in the first place is questionable, given the clear statutory language at bar.  Id. at 27–28.

[134] Id. at 28 (quoting the majority’s opinion).

[135] Id.

[136] Id.

[137] Id.

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] Id. (citing the majority opinion).

[143] Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II)).

[144] Id.

[145] Id. at 29.

[146] Id. (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 99-797, at 16 (1986)).

[147] Id.

[148] Id.

[149] Id. at 29–30.

[150] Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2)).

[151] Id.

[152] Id. (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 99–335, at 6 n.25 (1985)).

[153] Id.

[154] Id.

[155] Id.

[156] See id. at 34–35.

[157] See id. at 31–32.

[158] See id. at 35, 37.

[159] See id. at 33–34, 36.

[160] Id. at 32–34.

[161] Id. at 34.

[162] Id. at 20; see also id. at 34 n.6 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for reversing outright, rather than vacating and remanding, where the District Court had found “ample evidence” from which a jury could infer an up-front agreement).

[163] See id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[164] See 18 U.S.C. § 1912 (penalizing any officer engaged in the inspection of vessels who “receives any fee or reward for his services, except what is allowed to him by law”); 22 U.S.C. § 4202 (sanctioning any consular officer who “demands or receives for any official services . . . any fee or reward other than the fee provided by law for such service”); see also Snyder, 603 U.S. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that Snyder conceded that these statutes target gratuities).

[165] See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”); see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1995) (applying the surplusage canon to reject a statutory reading that would render a term “superfluous”).

[166] S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 370 (1983) (describing § 666 as enacted to protect “the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery”).  The legislative history is also discussed in Snyder, 603 U.S. at 27–29 (2024) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[167] H.R. Rep. No. 99-797, at 16 (1986); see also Snyder, 603 U.S. at 29 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-797 for the proposition that the 1986 changes to § 666 were “technical and minor”).

[168] H.R. Rep. No. 99-797, at 30 (1986); see also Snyder, 603 U.S. at 12; see Snyder, 603 U.S. at 29–30 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The dissent treats Congress’s addition of  “corruptly” to § 666 as a narrowing edit rather than as a basis for stripping the statute of its gratuities coverage.  Id.  The dissent draws the same inference from Congress’s parallel 1986 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 215, which likewise added “corruptly” without eliminating gratuities coverage.  Id. at 30.

[169] H.R. Rep. No. 99-797, at 16, 30 (1986).

[170] 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).

[171] McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 567–74 (2016).  The Court held that setting up a meeting, calling a state official, or hosting an event did not constitute an “official act” within the meaning of the bribery statute absent a formal exercise of governmental authority.  Id.

[172] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5, 19–20.  The Court held that § 666 prohibits bribes but does not cover post hoc gratuities, and it reversed Snyder’s conviction, which rested on a gratuity theory.  Id. at 20   The dissent noted that the district court had found ample circumstantial evidence of an up-front agreement and faulted the majority for reversing rather than vacating and remanding.  Id. at 34 n.6 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

[173] Id. at 14–15.  The majority noted that approximately nineteen million state and local government employees would potentially be subject to § 666’s prohibitions under the government’s reading.  Id.

[174] Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605–08 (2004) (holding § 666 constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a rational means of protecting federal spending programs from corruption, even without requiring a direct nexus between the corrupt act and specific federal funds).

[175] See id. at 606.

[176] Snyder, 603 U.S. at 35 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that the statute’s corrupt-intent requirement, together with its $5,000 transaction threshold, its transaction nexus, and its exclusion of compensation paid in the usual course of business “collectively do the nuanced work of sifting illegal gratuities from inoffensive ones.”  Id.

[177] The problem is not limited to sophisticated schemes; even crude schemes like the one in Snyder are now harder to prosecute under federal law.  See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 34 n.6 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court had found ample evidence from which a jury could infer an up-front agreement, yet the majority reversed the conviction rather than vacating and remanding).

[178] Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–409 (2010) (limiting § 1346 to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks; undisclosed conflicts of interest and similar self-dealing do not constitute honest services fraud regardless of how morally corrupt the conduct may be); see also Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5 (holding that § 666 continues to prohibit bribes).

[179] 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion under color of official right as the obtaining of property “under color of official right”); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257–68 (1992) (holding that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right requires an implicit quid pro quo, meaning that the official must accept a payment with the understanding that it is given in exchange for official action, but does not require proof of an explicit demand or active inducement by the official).  Where a payment is structured as a post hoc gratuity with no provable exchange understanding, Hobbs Act liability is unlikely to attach.  See also United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 145–47 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the quid pro quo requirement and distinguishing extortion from gratuitous payments).

[180] The Senate Report accompanying § 666’s enactment acknowledged this dynamic directly, noting that “state and local prosecutors are often unwilling to commit their limited resources to pursue such [corruption cases], deeming the United States the principal party aggrieved.”  S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 369 (1983).  See also Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo. L.J. 1171, 1172–73 (1977) (examining the expansion of federal jurisdiction over local corruption as a response to the perceived deficiencies of state law enforcement); Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10 Pepp. L. Rev. 321, 321 (1982) (“Because local law enforcement officials have frequently been unable or unwilling to pursue local political corruption, federal prosecutors have increasingly assumed responsibility for the policing of non-federal political criminal activity.”).

[181] See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (prohibiting a public official from “directly or indirectly demand[ing], seek[ing], receiv[ing], accept[ing], or agree[ing] to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (requiring corrupt intent and a connection to government business or transactions involving at least $5,000).  A corrective amendment to § 666 modeled on this language, while retaining § 666’s existing threshold and nexus requirements, would appear to address the interpretive gap the Snyder majority created.