Counting Harassment, Discounting Harm: Why “Severe or Pervasive” Falls Short

NOTE

Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2024) (en banc).

Haleigh J. Bachman*

I.  Introduction

How much harassment is enough?  When employees suffer harassment or find themselves in an abusive working environment in Missouri, they may choose to sue under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”),[1] which prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual regarding “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability.”[2]  Under the MHRA, employees must prove that the harassment was “severe or pervasive” enough to alter conditions of employment.[3]  Yet, after initiating suit, employees will quickly find that this endeavor is much more difficult than they may have initially imagined.  Though seemingly straightforward, severe or pervasive sets a high bar, frequently resulting in judgments favoring employers, even where employees have truly been harmed.[4]

But Matthews v. Harley-Davidson signals a positive development for employees suffering collective harassment or abuse.[5]  In Matthews, the Missouri Supreme Court held that claimants may rely on the cumulative effect of discriminatory conduct, even if they did not personally witness every incident.[6]  Though this decision eliminates some of that initial difficulty in satisfying the severe or pervasive standard, it also highlights an underlying issue: it is still unclear exactly when conduct becomes actionable.  

Part II details the facts and holding of the instant decision.  Part III provides the legal background relevant to this case.  It offers an overview of the motion to dismiss standard, focuses on the MHRA elements at issue for hostile work environment claims, and concludes with a discussion of aiding and abetting liability under the MHRA.  Part IV then explains the Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning that the employees in Matthews sufficiently pled conduct that satisfied the severe or pervasive standard, along with the court’s discussion of the aiding-and-abetting claim.  Part V finally critiques the standard through the lens of Matthews by arguing that it promotes uncertainty, and it offers paths forward for Missouri inspired by those adopted in other states.

II.  Facts and Holding

Harley-Davidson Motor Company Operations, Inc. (“Harley”) ceased manufacturing and assembling Harley-Davidson equipment, parts, and merchandise at its Kansas City, Missouri facility (the “Plant”) on May 24, 2019.[7]  Harley indicated that the Plant’s closure was primarily a financial decision to consolidate operations into its York, Pennsylvania final assembly plant.[8]  However, a series of racially charged incidents had been occurring at the Plant for some time and ultimately engendered this lawsuit.[9]  Just before the Plant’s closure, Appellants in this case—along with several other employees—filed racial discrimination charges with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and then a lawsuit against Harley and its contractor, Syncreon, alleging multiple violations of the MHRA, including hostile work environment and aiding and abetting racial discrimination.[10]   

Notably, the majority of the permanent workers at the Plant were white, and Harley also contracted with Syncreon to source workers for the Plant—with 90% of these contracted workers identifying as Black.[11]  While the Plant was still in operation, several “incidents with racial overtones” occurred:[12]  Syncreon’s hiring of a white supervisor who had previously been terminated by Harley for discriminating against Black employees; frequent racially motivated insults; a “physical racial division” that predominantly-Black Syncreon employees were barred from crossing but that majority-white Harley employees were free to cross; and bathrooms described as “functionally . . . racially segregated.”[13]  Appellants maintained that these incidents culminated in a “racially charged climate of fear, intimidation, and hostility for Black employees in the Plant that was a pattern and practice and constituted a continuing violation that subjected [Appellants] to discrimination, harassment[,] and retaliation based on their race,” ultimately causing Appellants to feel “unsafe” while at work.[14]

In addition to alleging a “climate” of harassment, Appellants alleged many specific, racially charged occurrences.[15]  These specific incidents included a noose found in a women’s bathroom in July 2017; a swastika and a doll of a Black woman hanging by a noose in April 2018; a Black Syncreon employee’s racially motivated assault being disregarded by the human resources department in November 2018; a white Syncreon employee displaying a Confederate flag and racist imagery in December 2018; racist graffiti including swastikas and racial slurs in January 2019; management directing Black employees to delete photos of more racist graffiti in February 2019; and a Plant manager ordering the disposal of a discovered noose.[16]  Appellants alleged that Harley and Syncreon neglected to conduct investigations into this conduct, issue disciplinary action, or take initiative to prevent further racially motivated misconduct from occurring at the Plant.[17]

Harley and Syncreon sought to dismiss Appellants’ claims, maintaining that they did not sufficiently state a claim because Appellants “failed to allege [they] ‘personally experienced’ any of the alleged harassing conduct or that Harley or Syncreon aided and abetted by providing ‘substantial assistance’ or ‘encouragement’ in the commission of acts prohibited under the MHRA.”[18] 

The trial court found for Harley and Syncreon, dismissing Appellants’ claims.[19]  Appellants subsequently appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for hostile work environment and their claims for aiding and abetting because they sufficiently stated a claim for each.[20]  The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that Appellants sufficiently pleaded claims for hostile work environment and aiding and abetting.[21]

III.  Legal Background

This Part outlines the governing legal background relevant to both of Appellants’ claims.  It first addresses the motion to dismiss standard in Section A, then summarizes the MHRA framework for hostile work environment claims—focusing on the “subject to” and “severe or pervasive” elements—in Section B, and concludes with the undefined contours of aiding and abetting liability under the MHRA in Section C.

A.    Motion to Dismiss Standard

Missouri appellate courts review de novo a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.[22]  Considering the adequacy of the petition to determine whether it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Missouri courts “accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader.”[23]  Missouri courts must refrain from weighing the credibility of the factual allegations,[24] and instead review the petition to “determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.”[25]  As a fact-pleading state, Missouri requires that the pleader provide the “ultimate” facts supporting the claim, rather than evidentiary facts or conclusory assertions of law or fact.[26]  “Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict for the [claimant].”[27]

B.    Missouri Human Rights Act: Hostile Work Environment

The MHRA governs discrimination claims relating to conduct—including hostile work environment claims—when the hostility was aimed at an individual because of his or her membership in a protected class.[28]  Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized hostile work environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,[29] interpreting the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to “strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.”[30]  Because Section 213.055 of the MHRA is analogous to Title VII provision 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, Missouri courts draw on state law and Title VII to determine the outcomes of these claims.[31] 

In Missouri, the elements of a hostile work environment claim include the following:

 (1) [claimant] is a member of a group protected under the MHRA; (2) [claimant] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the [claimant]’s membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, condition, or privilege of the [claimant]’s employment was affected by the harassment.[32]

The elements at issue in Matthews v. Harley-Davidson were the second and fourth, as Harley and Syncreon maintained that Appellants had not sufficiently pled either.[33]  Accordingly, this Section focuses solely on these two elements and provides case law analyzing whether a claimant was subject to unwelcome harassment as well as whether a term, condition, or privilege of employment was impacted by harassment. 

1.     “Subject To”: Personal Experiences or an Atmosphere of Discrimination?

Courts analyzing hostile work environment claims under the MHRA and Title VII have been hesitant to recognize unspecific claims from claimants who have not personally witnessed the alleged discriminatory conduct at issue.  Burkett v. Glickman provides an example of this hesitancy.[34]  In Burkett, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant employer on Beverly Burkett’s Title VII hostile work environment claim.[35]  Burkett, a Black woman, worked at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency.[36]  She alleged that she was “subjected to a hostile work environment, including being present during the utterance of racially prejudicial remarks by supervisors and by racially motivated hostile treatment by coworkers.”[37]  However, she did not provide evidence showing that she personally witnessed the remarks nor could she describe the substance of the remarks.[38]  Though she offered deposition testimony from a white colleague indicating that Burkett’s supervisor occasionally uttered racial slurs, another Black employee indicated that he never heard these utterances.[39]  The Eighth Circuit emphasized that “[o]ffhand comments and isolated incidents of offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) do not constitute a hostile work environment.”[40]  Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that because Burkett did not present enough evidence to support her allegations, a reasonable jury could not conclude she was subjected to a hostile work environment.[41]

Burkett illustrates that courts require more than generalized allegations of discriminatory conduct occurring somewhere in the workplace.[42]  When claimants cannot show that they personally experienced or that they were directly subjected to discriminatory hostility, their hostile work environment claims are unlikely to succeed.[43]

2.     Cumulative Effects: Severe and Pervasive Racial Discrimination

Discriminatory harassment impacts a term, condition, or privilege of employment if it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive.”[44]  To establish that an action was so severe or pervasive as to change their working conditions, claimants can cite either a tangible employment action or an abusive working environment.[45]  In assessing these claims, courts are guided by the totality of the circumstances,[46] as the discriminatory acts at issue are usually “not of a nature that can be identified individually as significant events; instead, the day-to-day harassment is primarily significant . . . in its cumulative effect.”[47]  Finally, the conduct must be severe or pervasive “as viewed subjectively by the claimant and as viewed objectively by a reasonable person” to change the claimant’s working conditions.[48]  Thus, conduct that falls within the “ordinary tribulations of the workplace” will not alter the terms or conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment,[49] including “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious).”[50]

McGaughy v. Laclede Gas Co. illustrates how individual yet repeated racially discriminatory incidents can amount to a hostile work environment due to their cumulative effect.[51]  In McGaughy, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District considered whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant employer’s motion for a directed verdict on Danielle McGaughy’s claim for racial discrimination under the MHRA because “she did not have a submissible case of a hostile work environment, in that the evidence specific to her was isolated and incidental rather than severe and pervasive.”[52]  Shortly after McGaughy, a Black woman, began working at the St. Joseph office of Laclede Gas Co.,[53] she testified that she faced multiple incidents of racial hostility.[54]  McGaughy overheard a foreman state that “[B]lacks don’t take pride in their work, where they live, or anything”; observed a white co-worker describe President Obama as a “monkey”; and saw racially charged materials and emails circulated around the office.[55]  She testified that her colleagues frequently used racial slurs and directed derogatory comments toward her,[56] that the employee assigned to train her refused to do so because she did not want her job “taken by a n****r,” and that her complaints to human resources were met with dismissive responses.[57]  

Using the totality of the circumstances approach to assess whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, the court found that McGaughy provided “substantial evidence” that these incidents culminated in a hostile work environment because they were recurrent and abundant.[58]  The court further recognized that McGaughy subjectively felt personally offended by these actions and that the jury found that a reasonable person would also be offended by these actions, holding that this amounted to severe and pervasive hostility which impacted a term, condition, or privilege of her employment.[59]

Despite McGaughy’s outcome, Rollins v. Missouri Department of Conservation demonstrates that courts are unlikely to find that isolated incidents amount to a hostile work environment.[60]  In Rollins, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri considered whether summary judgment was appropriate on Mike Rollins’s hostile work environment claim under Title VII and the MHRA.[61]  Rollins, a Black employee of the Missouri Department of Conservation, alleged he experienced racial hostility based primarily on a coworker’s use of a racial slur and the Department’s alleged failure to adequately respond to his complaints.[62]  The record reflected that the coworker used the slur once prior to Rollins’s employment and once more in a manner Rollins overheard.[63]  Because these events were isolated and because Rollins’s complaints to the Department exhibited little specificity, the court determined that a reasonable jury could not find that his allegations sufficiently showed that a term, condition, or privilege of his employment were impacted.[64]

These cases highlight the importance of evaluating alleged discrimination in context.  While isolated incidents typically do not meet the severe or pervasive threshold, repeated discriminatory conduct, considered cumulatively, may create an abusive working environment sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim.

C.    Missouri Human Rights Act: Aiding and Abetting

Under the MHRA, it is unlawful “for an employer . . . [t]o aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the commission of acts prohibited under [the MHRA] or to attempt to do so[.]”[65]  However, the MHRA does not provide definitions for the terms “aid” and “abet.”[66]

In the absence of such statutory definitions, courts have been tasked with defining the contours of aiding and abetting liability under the MHRA, as demonstrated in Matthews v. Harley-Davidson.  Missouri courts find the plain and ordinary meanings of words instructive in the absence of statutory definitions and should draw on dictionary definitions.[67]  According to the Missouri Supreme Court, “words having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import,” and “may be derived from Black’s Law Dictionary.”[68]  Further, Missouri courts presume the legislature draws on the judicial or common law meaning when it incorporates undefined statutory terms into legislation.[69]

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “aiding-and-abetting liability” as “[civil] or, more typically, criminal liability imposed on one who assists in or facilitates the commission of an act that results in harm or loss, or who otherwise promotes the act’s accomplishment.”[70]  Additionally, the Restatement (Second) of TortsSection 876(b) asserts that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.”[71]  The Restatementalso notes that “[t]he assistance of or participation by the defendant may not be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other.”[72]  It further provides that the court should consider “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other[,] and his state of mind” to determine whether a defendant provided substantial encouragement or assistance.[73]  

The court’s decision in Matthews v. Harley-Davidson demonstrates how these principles operate in practice when applied to Appellants’ allegations.

IV.  Instant Decision

In Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the lower court’s dismissal of Appellants’ (A) hostile work environment and (B) aiding and abetting claims.[74] 

A.    Hostile Work Environment Claim

Before substantively addressing the sufficiency of Appellants’ hostile work environment pleading, the court raised and dismissed the elements not at issue: (1) that Appellants are members of a protected group and (3) that race was a motivating factor in the harassment.[75] 

The court then considered the second element of a hostile work environment claim under the MHRA, analyzing whether Appellants sufficiently pleaded that they were subjected to unwelcome harassment.[76]  Citing the specific allegations of Appellants’ pleading, the court noted that the instances including swastikas, nooses, and racial slurs “constituted ‘individually and collectively, racial harassment.’”[77]  Though the court agreed with Harley and Syncreon that Appellants did not allege that they personally witnessed any of the incidents at issue, the court found that “these incidents . . . by their very nature, targeted and preyed on all [B]lack employees in the Plant.”[78]  Thus, by emphasizing that these incidents fostered a collective feeling of discrimination, the court concluded that Appellants were “subjected to” unwelcome harassment—even if they did not personally experience each incident—and therefore had sufficiently pleaded the second element of their hostile work environment claim.[79]

Next, the court discussed the fourth element in a hostile work environment claim under the MHRA, considering whether Appellants sufficiently pleaded that a term, condition, or privilege of their employment was affected by the harassment.[80]  Again, the court referenced Appellants’ pleadings which described that the “‘ongoing series and cumulative effect’ of the racial incidents they alleged ‘was so pervasive or severe as to create a hostile work environment for each [Appellant],’ which directly caused Appellants damages and injury to their dignity and civil rights.”[81]  Appellants further alleged that the harassment unreasonably affected their work and adversely influenced their physiological well-being,[82] indicating that this conduct would be seen as severe and pervasive harassment from the subjective perspective of Appellants and the objective perspective of a reasonable person.[83]  

Using the totality of circumstances framework, the court agreed that Appellants sufficiently pleaded that they subjectively viewed the environment as severe or pervasive enough to be abusive—both subjectively by Appellants and objectively by a reasonable person.[84]  The court referenced the incidents listed in Part II, holding that Appellants sufficiently and successfully pleaded all elements of a hostile work environment claim under the MHRA.[85]

B.    Aiding and Abetting Claim

The court began its analysis of Appellants’ aiding and abetting claim by recognizing the absence of definitions for “aid” and “abet” in the MHRA.[86]  The court thus looked to Black’s Law Dictionary definition of aiding and abetting liability: “[civil] or, more typically, criminal liability imposed on one who assists in or facilitates the commission of an act that results in harm or loss, or who otherwise promotes the act’s accomplishment.”[87] 

Further, though the court had not yet outlined the amount of facts necessary to support an MHRA aiding and abetting claim, it found guidance in the Restatement (Second) of TortsSection 876(b), which asserts that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.”[88]  The Restatementalso notes that “[t]he assistance of or participation by the defendant may not be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other.”[89]  It further provides that the court should consider “the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other[,] and his state of mind” to determine whether a defendant provided substantial encouragement or assistance.[90]  Finally, the court recognized the fact-specific nature of employment discrimination claims, emphasizing that the court may rely on inferences to find liability.[91]

The court addressed Appellants’ allegations against Syncreon first.[92]  It noted that Appellants specifically alleged multiple instances pointing to Syncreon’s substantial encouragement of and assistance with prohibited behavior, including “‘urg[ing]’ employees to ‘stay quiet about’ incidents . . . , ‘discard[ing] written employee complaints into a trash can,’ and misleading an employee as to the status of an investigation into a noose incident.”[93]  The court, recognizing that these actions were sufficiently pleaded to establish a hostile work environment claim, inferred that these actions could suggest Syncreon allowed, substantially encouraged, and assisted in creating a hostile work environment.[94]

Turning to the allegations against Harley, the court highlighted the interrelated nature of Syncreon’s business operations with Harley, emphasizing that Harley’s right to control Syncreon’s behavior manifested in Harley’s physical racial divide at the Plant and functionally racially segregated bathrooms.[95]  The court referenced Appellants’ allegations that “Harley’s ‘command over the employment structure, and the resulting deference shown to Harley management by Syncreon, reinforced the Plant’s physical segregation and endorsed the ongoing structural conflict between Black and white employees.’”[96]  The court also highlighted Appellants’ allegations that Harley did not stop Syncreon supervisors or its own employees from participating in conduct resulting in the hostile work environment.[97]  Considering the sufficiency of these allegations, the court found that Harley “affirmed the ongoing racial conflict conducted by others in the plant and substantially encouraged or assisted in the creation of a hostile work environment.”[98]

Finally, the court addressed Appellants’ claims against Syncreon or Harley, specifically that management for either company directed Appellants to delete photos of racist graffiti and that a “Plant manager” directed a “Plant supervisor” to dispose of the noose.[99]  Highlighting that courts must liberally construe pleadings, accept facts as true, and view facts favorably to the pleading party in a motion to dismiss ruling, the court held that these pleadings reflected that Syncreon, Harley, or both participated in these actions, thus substantially encouraging or assisting discriminatory conduct fostering a hostile work environment.[100]  The court held that Appellants sufficiently pleaded their claims for aiding and abetting.[101]

In conclusion, the court summarized its holdings, ultimately denying the motion to dismiss, vacating the trial court’s judgment relating to these three claims, and remanding the case for further proceedings.[102]

V.  Comment

This Note argues that Matthews v. Harley-Davidson represents a meaningful step toward recognizing the cumulative nature of workplace harassment, though it ultimately exposes a deeper flaw in the severe or pervasive standard, which operates as a heightened bar that often fails to clearly define when actionable harm occurs.  Part A critiques this standard, while Part B argues that Missouri should follow other states in adopting a more realistic and accessible standard for workplace harassment claims.

A.    Matthews Got It Right, Yet the Severe or Pervasive Standard Obscures When Liability Should Attach

The instant decision represents a key development for claimants alleging hostile work environment claims under Missouri employment discrimination law.  Matthews emphasizes that cumulative severe and pervasive actions can amount to a successfully pleaded hostile work environment claim even where claimants have not personally witnessed each incident.[103]  This is particularly significant given the nature of the incidents at issue in the case, notably the repeated use of racial slurs and epithets by supervisors and employees of Harley and Syncreon.[104] 

To understand the significance of Matthews,it is essential to recognize that racism and racial hostility manifest not only through interpersonal interactions, but also through symbols that send a broader message of hostility, exclusion, and intimidation.[105]  A symbol exists as “a mark, sign, or word that indicates, signifies, or is understood as representing an idea, object, or relationship.”[106]  Because symbols communicate these kinds of messages that are widely understood within a cultural context,[107] they may convey hostility even without direct interaction. 

Certain symbols are particularly egregious because of their associations with racial violence.[108]  Scholars have emphasized that racial symbols frequently serve to “incite, insult, and intimidate,” reinforcing harmful social perceptions and perpetuating conflict.[109]  For example, the “hangman’s noose” represents extreme violence and brutality directed toward Black individuals in the United States and is rooted in the nation’s historical practice of lynching.[110]  Similarly, racial slurs carry powerful historical meaning that remains connected to contemporary use.[111]  Racial slurs—particularly those directed toward Black individuals—have historically served as “term[s] of exclusion,” demeaning Black Americans, justifying discrimination, and reinforcing harmful and inaccurate stereotypes.[112]  Because these symbols so clearly communicate hostility, their presence in a workplace—much like that in Matthews—signals an environment of racial intimidation even when the conduct is not directed at a particular individual.

However, not every instance of racially offensive conduct automatically gives rise to a successful hostile work environment claim—even when it may be especially harmful.[113]  Courts evaluating hostile work environment claims must still determine whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.[114]  Rollins and similar cases ultimately illustrate that this standard serves as a heightened bar for claimants, as “there must be proof that the alleged harassing conduct ‘was so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment.’”[115]  In fact, despite the appalling historical context surrounding racial slurs and symbols in the United States, it is well established that “‘mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not sufficiently alter the terms and conditions of employment to violate Title VII.”[116]  The same rule is similarly applied in cases brought under the MHRA.[117]

In addition to the difficulties posed by the heightened factual standard, claimants in Missouri face additional procedural barriers to bringing successful hostile work environment claims.[118]  Workers may be deterred by an extreme economic power imbalance, lack of access to information, or personal and career risks.[119]  These concerns, while potentially inhibiting claimants from bringing their cases, also lead to challenges in the pleading stage.[120]  Missouri is a fact-pleading state, meaning claimants must allege the ultimate facts that if true, establish the elements of their claims.[121]  Dismissal is appropriate only when it appears that the claimant can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief.[122]  Although courts reviewing motions to dismiss must accept well-pleaded facts as true, construe allegations liberally, and view them in the light most favorable to the claimant,[123] if the claimant lacks the resources to pursue a claim or cannot access the relevant information, their claim may fail before it can be judged on its merits.

Nevertheless, incidents involving racially charged symbols or discriminatory conduct may be especially probative and harmful to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the powerful messages they convey.  Such actions communicate hostility not only to those who personally observe them but also to members of the protected group more broadly.  Yet discrete harmful actions impacting individuals or even a larger community may not ultimately rise to the severe or pervasive standard.

Thus, Matthews exposes an underlying problem that existing standard does not successfully resolve: how much harassment is enough?  One incident?  What about two?  Three?  More?  If egregious conduct may not give rise to a successful hostile work environment claim on its own, claimants are effectively required to endure repeated harm before their claims become actionable.  Take Matthews,for example: at which point does the conduct become severe or pervasive?  Had these incidents not been considered together,[124] the Missouri Supreme Court may have reached a different conclusion.  Thus, this standard risks excusing serious misconduct simply because it has not yet become pervasive or cumulative.

B.    Rethinking Severe or Pervasive

Accordingly, there is a growing movement among scholars to redefine and reconsider the severe or pervasive standard—both at the federal and state level—because it is disconnected from contemporary understandings of harassment and the modern workplace.[125]  These calls for an updated or altogether new standard recognize that “[t]he ‘severe or pervasive’ standard does not reflect the realities of our workplaces, power dynamics, or modern understandings of harassment at work and its impacts on those who experience it.”[126] 

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, a 2024 decision, has been at the forefront of this discussion.  In Muldrow, the U.S Supreme Court held that employees bringing Title VII employment discrimination claims “must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”[127]  Muldrow lowered the bar for claimants bringing discrimination claims, asserting that claimants need not allege “significant harm” to succeed.[128]  Courts, practitioners, and scholars subsequently considered whether this decision impacted hostile work environment claims,[129] with some federal courts of appeals ultimately holding that it did not.[130]  These decisions reflect that amending the severe or pervasive standard for hostile work environment claims under Title VII may be a slow-moving process.  Therefore, scholars have been advocating for states to lead the initiative.[131] 

At least five states have already paved the way.[132]  As the first state to reform the heightened standard in 2018, California passed statutes specifying that “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment.”[133]  Adopting a totality of the circumstances standard, California law further indicates that “a discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the context of an employment decision or uttered by a nondecisionmaker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”[134]

New York, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Colorado, and Vermont have similarly turned further away from the heightened severe or pervasive standard, instead adopting a lower threshold for these kinds of claims.[135]  These states have all eliminated the severe or pervasive standard, [136] with Maryland and the District of Columbia having substituted the severe or pervasive standard for a totality of the circumstances standard like California.[137]  Notably, although courts currently look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive,[138] the updated standards often require that courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether conduct creates a hostile work environment.[139]

These changes reflect heightened worker protections and a growing recognition that the law should not hinge on an arbitrary tally—one incident, two, three, or more—but instead acknowledge that even a single act of harassment can meaningfully alter the conditions of employment.  This Note calls for Missouri to engage in this dialogue and enact similar legislation, recognizing that modern workplace conduct can be abhorrent and incredibly harmful, even when only a single incident has occurred.  

VI.  Conclusion

Matthews v. Harley-Davidson reaches the right result, but it also makes clear what the standard still cannot do.  The court accepts that harassment can be collective and cumulative—even when not personally witnessed by Appellants—but it leaves intact a standard that offers no real guidance on when that harassment becomes actionable.  The severe or pervasive standard invites after-the-fact judgments that frequently turn on whether the conduct happened often enough rather than whether it was harmful enough.  Missouri should not require this kind of accumulation.  Other states have already begun to move away from this heightened standard, recognizing that a single incident can be enough when the conduct is sufficiently severe. [140]  Missouri should do the same.  Until then, Matthews does not solve the problem; it merely makes it harder to ignore.

*B.A., Major in Art History, Minor in Anthropology and Sociology, Loyola University Chicago, 2024; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2027; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2025–2026; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2026–2027.  Many thanks to the members of the Missouri Law Review for bringing this Note to life.  It has truly been a joy!

[1] Gilliand v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 521 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[2] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (2017).

[3] Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing McGaughy v. Laclede Gas Co., 604 S.W.3d 730, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)); Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666. 

[4] See Understanding Hostile Work Environment Lawsuits: A Comprehensive Guide for HR Professionals, Tulane L. Blog (Oct. 01, 2025), https://online.law.tulane.edu/blog/hostile-work-environment-lawsuit (“Approximately 72% of summary judgment motions are granted, often favoring employers.”). 

[5] See Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2024) (en banc).

[6] Id. at 364.

[7] Id. at 363.

[8] Kyle Palmer, Harley-Davidson Will Close Its Kansas City Assembly Plant, KCUR News (Jan. 30, 2018, at 08:33 CST), https://www.kcur.org/news/2018-01-30/harley-davidson-will-close-its-kansas-city-assembly-plant.

[9] See Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 363–64.

[10] Id. at 364.  According to Appellant’s petition, each Appellant identified as Black or a Person of Color and was jointly employed by Harley and Syncreon.  Id.  “One Appellant was employed directly by Harley; all other Appellants were employed directly by Syncreon.”  Id.

[11] Id. at 363–64.

[12] Id. at 364 (internal quotations omitted).  

[13] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[14] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at 364–65.

[17] Id. at 365.

[18] Id. at 364 (emphasis added).  Timothy Ertz, a representative of Syncreon, indicated that “[W]e believe that Missouri has always required, under the fact pleading standard, that anyone who’s been harmed in any type of cause of action must say how they have been physically injured.  That has not happened in this case,” and that “[t]here is no breakdown of what each individual experienced.”  KY3 Staff, Missouri Supreme Court Hears Former Employees’ Case Against Now-Closed Harley Davidson Plant, KY3 (Oct. 11, 2023 at 17:10  CDT), https://www.ky3.com/2023/10/11/missouri-supreme-court-hears-former-employees-case-against-now-closed-harley-davidson-plant/.  Additionally, Harley and Syncreon did not move to dismiss the remaining seven employees named in the petition, focusing for purposes of this litigation, on the personal experiences of Appellants only.  Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 364.

[19] Matthews v. Davidson, No. WD 85267, 2023 WL 3183844, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. May 2, 2023); Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Mo. 2024) (en banc); Matthews v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. Operations Inc., 2022 WL 10460700, at *1 (Mo. Cir. Apr. 29, 2022).

[20] Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Mo. 2024) (en banc).

[21] Id.

[22] R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).

[23] Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 601 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).

[24] Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).

[25] Id.

[26] Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); see also R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry, 568 S.W.3d at 425.

[27] Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 523 S.W.3d 452, 463 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).

[28] Gilliand v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 521 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[29] Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).

[30] Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

[31] Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).

[32] Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021); see also Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 666.

[33] Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 368 (Mo. 2024) (en banc).

[34] See Burkett v. Glickman, 327 F.3d 658, 661–62 (8th Cir. 2003).

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 659.

[37] Id. at 661.

[38] Id. at 661–62.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] See id.

[43] See, e.g., Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 617–18 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that racial insults not directly heard by the claimant and pranks not shown to be connected to racial hostility did not establish an objectively hostile work environment); Arraleh v. Cnty. Of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 979–80 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that “harassment standards are demanding” and holding that hostile work environment claim failed because many of the alleged comments were unrelated to claimant’s race or national origin, and there was no evidence that the comments interfered with his ability to perform his duties); Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 637 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a plaintiff cannot rely on evidence of harassment of which she was unaware during the time she was allegedly subject to a hostile work environment); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 892–93 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that racial slurs not made directly to the claimant and lacking sufficient frequency or severity do not result in an objectively hostile work environment and noting that none of the comments were made directly to claimant and that racial epithets alone are insufficient to alter the conditions of employment).

[44] Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing McGaughy v. Laclede Gas Co., 604 S.W.3d 730, 748 (Mo. App. 2020)); Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[45] McGaughy, 604 S.W.3d at 748; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 64.

[46] Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994)).

[47] McGaughy, 604 S.W.3d at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting Alhalabi v. Mo. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 300 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).

[48] Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 260, 368 (Mo. 2024) (en banc) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).

[49] Anderson v. Durham D & M, L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 2010).

[50] Wright v. Rolette Cnty., 417 F.3d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 2005).

[51] McGaughy, 604 S.W.3d at 750–51.

[52] Id. at 745.

[53] McGaughy initially worked for Missouri Gas Energy, later acquired by Laclede Gas Co.  Id. at 738.  She started work in the Kansas City office as a legal assistant but transferred to the St. Joseph office as an engineering technician to spend more time with her son because she lived in St. Joseph full time and did not want to continue making the long commute.  Id. at 738–39.

[54] Id. at 750–51.

[55] Id.  “[W]hen news broke that celebrity Chef Paula Deen used the word ‘n****r’ to an African-American employee, Labass displayed several Paula Deen magazines on her desk.  Another time [McGaughy] went into the copy room and found an email Labass was photocopying.  The email stated, ‘that the blacks and Mexicans were taking over and the Caucasians needed to take their money out of the banks because Obama was going to bankrupt and close all the banks and that they needed to take their money and invest it in gold bars.’”  Id. at 749.

[56] “[McGaughy] testified Martin would come into the office and mockingly sing ‘negro spirituals,’ singing ‘free at last, free at last, thank God almighty we’re free at last like these mother f—–s are.’”  Id. at 750.  “[McGaughy] called Gard to testify at trial.  He testified that he heard Martin use the term ‘n****r’ ‘too many times to count,’ and that he heard Martin refer to [McGaughy] as a ‘dumb j*g’ one time in the office.  Gard also testified he heard Martin refer to [McGaughy] as a ‘dumb [B]lack bitch’ on another occasion.”  Id.

[57] Id. at 750–51.  “Moran mentioned that he had discussed [McGaughy’s] concerns with Williams and Hart, and then Williams alleged that [McGaughy] was having an intimate relationship with Gard, a Caucasian co-worker.  Moran then told her, ‘I think you need to take a look at yourself; sometimes we have to take a look at ourselves and see why people treat us the way they do,’ and Hart accused her of not being helpful to her co-workers.”  Id. at 750.  “[McGaughy]’s 2013 HR complaint also alluded to some of Martin’s conduct, leading to Martin angrily entering her office with two other Caucasian co-workers telling her to ‘keep me off your radar,’ and ‘[y]ou don’t know a f—–g thing and you don’t do a f—–g thing.  You’re a nothing and a nobody.’”  Id.

[58] Id. at 751.

[59] Id.

[60] Rollins v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026–28 (W.D. Mo. 2004).

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.1(1) (2017).

[66] See id. § 213.010 (2017).

[67] State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[68] State v. Bales, 630 S.W.3d 754, 761 n.5 (Mo. 2021) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted).

[69] State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).

[70] Aiding-and-Abetting Liability, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

[71] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (A.L.I. 1979).

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Mo. 2024) (en banc).

[75] Id. at 367–68.  Appellants alleged that they are Black or a Person of Color.  Id. at 368.  Appellants also alleged that “[a]ll of the aforementioned racial, derogatory race-based comments, insults, and bullying by [Harley and Syncreon] were directed at [Appellants] because of their race” and that race was “a motivating factor” in Harley and Syncreon’s attempts to curate an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.  Id. at 367–68.

[76] Id. at 368.

[77] Id. (quoting the complaint).

[78] Id. (emphasis in original).

[79] Id.

[80] Id.

[81] Id.

[82] Id.

[83] Id. at 368–69. 

The harassment to which [Appellants] were subjected would affect the physiological well-being of a reasonable person and would unreasonably interfere with the work performance of a reasonable person.  [Appellants] subjectively perceived [Harley and Syncreon]’s treatment to be inappropriate, hostile, and offensive; and a reasonable person in [Appellants’] circumstances would consider [Harley and Syncreon]’s treatment to be objectively inappropriate, hostile[,] and offensive.

Id.

[84] Id. at 369.

[85] Id.

[86] Id.

[87] Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aiding-and-Abetting Liability, supra note 70).

[88] Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 71).

[89] Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 71).

[90] Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 71).

[91] Id. at 369–70.

[92] Id. at 370.

[93] Id.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Id.

[103] Id. at 369.

[104] Id. at 364–66.

[105] See Deb Muller, The 10 Most Common Types of Workplace Harassment, HR Acuity (Jan. 20, 2026), https://www.hracuity.com/blog/workplace-harassment/ (indicating that “racial harassment in the workplace may consist of: [d]isplaying racist symbols on or offline[,] [m]ocking a person’s accent[,] [m]aking unwelcome comments about a person’s race[,] [t]elling derogatory jokes[,] [u]sing racial slurs[, and] [e]xpressing general intolerance toward any particular race group”).

[106] Judy Rashid, Racial Justice Conflict: How “Historical” Racial Symbols Shape Perception, Practices, and Policy, Mediate.com (Sept. 3, 2020), https://mediate.com/racial-justice-conflict-how-historical-racial-symbols-shape-perception-practices-and-policy/.

[107] Miles Asher Cohen, Symbols of Hate: The History of White Supremacism Through Symbolic Representation 9 (Apr. 2023), https://digitalcollections.wesleyan.edu/Documents/Detail/symbols-of-hate-the-history-of-white-supremacism-through-symbolic-representation/549393.

[108] Alaa Elassar, Why the Noose is Such a Potent Symbol of Hate, CNN (June 23, 2020, at 18:22 EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/us/noose-hate-symbol-racism-trnd; David Pilgrim & Phillip Middleton, N****r and Caricature, Jim Crow Museum (2023), https://jimcrowmuseum.ferris.edu/caricature/homepage.htm.

[109] Rashid, supra note 106.

[110] Elassar, supra note 108 (“The NAACP estimates that more than 4,700 people were lynched in the US between 1882 and 1968, although Shuler believes the number is probably much higher.  Almost 73% of them were Black.”).

[111] Rashid, supra note 106; Pilgrim & Middleton, supra note 108.

[112] Pilgrim & Middleton, supra note 108 (“Whether used as a noun, verb, or adjective, it reinforced the stereotype of the lazy, stupid, dirty, worthless parasite.  No other American ethnophaulism carried so much purposeful venom . . . .”).

[113] Harassment, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/harassment (last visited Mar. 16, 2026) (“Petty slights, annoyances, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not rise to the level of illegality. To be unlawful, the conduct must create a work environment that would be intimidating, hostile, or offensive to reasonable people.”) (emphasis added); see Rollins v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026–28 (W.D. Mo. 2004).

[114] Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).

[115] Rollins, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (emphasis added) (quoting Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted)).

[116] See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971)).

[117] See, e.g., Rollins, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1011; Shiffman v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Club, LLC, 687 S.W.3d 443, 470 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024); Arraleh v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006).

[118] Jenny R. Yang & Jane Liu, Strengthening Accountability for Discrimination, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/strengthening-accountability-for-discrimination-confronting-fundamental-power-imbalances-in-the-employment-relationship/.

[119] Id.

[120] Id.

[121] Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); see also R.M.A. ex rel. Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Mo. 2019).

[122] Mo. State Conf. of NAACP v. State, 601 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).

[123] Id.

[124] See supra Part II.

[125] Eric Bachman, A Movement is Afoot to Redefine Hostile Work Environment / Harassment Laws, Forbes (Jan. 06, 2021, at 13:43 EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbachman/2021/01/06/a-movement-is-afoot-to-redefine-hostile-work-environment-harassment-laws/; State Lawmakers Lowering the Bar for Workplace Harassment, LexisNexis (Apr. 24, 2024), https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/capitol-journal/b/state-net/posts/state-lawmakers-lowering-bar-for-workplace-harassment.

[126] Kristy D’Angelo-Corker, Severe or Pervasive Should Not Mean Impossible and Unattainable: Why the “Severe or Pervasive” Standard for a Claim of Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Should Be Replaced With a Less Stringent and More Current Standard, 50 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 3 (2021).

[127] Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024).

[128]Id. at 355; The Evolving Impact of the Muldrow Ruling on Employment Cases, SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/advocacy/the-evolving-impact-of-the-muldrow-ruling-on-employment-cases (last visited Apr. 14, 2026).

[129] The Evolving Impact of the Muldrow Ruling on Employment Cases, supra note 128.

[130] Russell v. Driscoll, 157 F.4th 1348 (10th Cir. 2025); Clobes v. 3M Co., 106 F.4th 803 (8th Cir. 2024).

[131] D’Angelo-Corker, supra note 126.

[132] State Lawmakers Lowering the Bar for Workplace Harassment, supra note 125.

[133] Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923 (West 2019); State Lawmakers Lowering the Bar for Workplace Harassment, supra note 125.  However, this was passed as a non-binding declaration meant to persuade the courts.  Id.

[134] Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923 (West 2019).

[135] State Lawmakers Lowering the Bar for Workplace Harassment, supra note 125.

[136] N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2026) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to subject any individual to harassment because of an individual’s . . . race . . .  regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims.”); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 (West 2026) (“‘Harassment’ includes . . . unwelcome and offensive conduct, which need not be severe or pervasive . . . .”); D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (2023) (“Conduct need not be severe or pervasive to constitute harassment and no specific number of incidents or specific level of egregiousness is required.”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-400.2 (2023) (“Additionally, the general assembly . . . [f]inds that the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard created by courts to determine if harassment at work is a discriminatory or an unfair employment practice does not take into account the realities of the workplace or the harm that workplace harassment causes; and . . . [r]ejects the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard for proof of workplace harassment in favor of a standard that prohibits unwelcome harassment.”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (2023) (“Notwithstanding any State or federal judicial precedent to the contrary . . . harassment and discrimination need not be severe or pervasive to constitute a violation of this section.”).

[137] D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (2023) (“In determining whether conduct constitutes unlawful harassment under this subsection, a finder of fact shall consider the totality of the circumstances and view conduct based on multiple protected characteristics in totality, rather than in isolation.”); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 (West 2026)  (“‘Harassment’ includes . . . unwelcome and offensive conduct, which need not be severe or pervasive, when . . . the conduct is based on race . . . and . . . submission to the conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment of an individual . . . based on the totality of the circumstances, the conduct unreasonably creates a working environment that a reasonable person would perceive to be abusive or hostile . . . .”).

[138] Eivins v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994)).

[139] See D.C. Code § 2-1402.11 (2023)  (“In determining whether conduct constitutes unlawful harassment under this subsection, a finder of fact shall consider the totality of the circumstances and view conduct based on multiple protected characteristics in totality, rather than in isolation.”); Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 (West 2026) (“‘Harassment’ includes . . . unwelcome and offensive conduct, which need not be severe or pervasive, when . . . the conduct is based on race . . . and . . . submission to the conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment of an individual . . . based on the totality of the circumstances, the conduct unreasonably creates a working environment that a reasonable person would perceive to be abusive or hostile . . . .”).

[140] See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.