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John Gabriel*
I. Introduction
If a circuit split, competing interpretations of a criminal statute, and disagreement among members of the Supreme Court are insufficient to trigger the rule of lenity, then what amount of ambiguity is sufficient to do so? The Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. United States answered this question by rejecting the application of lenity in a case involving genuine disagreement over the meaning of a federal sentencing statute.[1] The rule of lenity is a longstanding principle of statutory interpretation requiring courts to resolve genuine ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.[2] The federal safety valve, by contrast, allows certain defendants convicted of drug offenses to avoid otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentences if they satisfy specified statutory requirements.[3] Although Pulsifer resolved a dispute over eligibility for safety valve relief, the decision also reflects a shift in how modern courts approach the rule of lenity.[4]
For centuries, the rule of lenity was a safeguard against expanding criminal punishment where Congress failed to speak with sufficient clarity.[5] However, recent decisions suggest that courts are more willing to resolve statutory ambiguity through textual, structural, and contextual analysis before ever invoking lenity.[6] As a result, the rule’s practical role has become severely limited, thus raising important questions about whether it continues to serve the purposes for which it was originally developed.[7]
This article argues that Pulsifer demonstrates the continued narrowing of the rule of lenity and illustrates how modern courts have departed from the doctrine’s historical justifications by resolving statutory ambiguity through increasingly expansive interpretive methodologies rather than in favor of criminal defendants. Specifically, it argues that the Court’s modern approach undermines the rule of lenity’s traditional role in protecting fair notice, legislative accountability, and individual liberty; expands prosecutorial leverage by increasing defendants’ exposure to mandatory minimum sentences during plea negotiations; and is difficult to justify where the empirical evidence supporting increasingly severe punishment remains inconclusive.
II. Legal Background
A. Historical Origins and the Purposes of the Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is one of the oldest interpretive principles in Anglo-American criminal law.[8] The rule provides that if there are ambiguities in a criminal statute, courts should interpret that statute in the way that is most favorable to the defendant.[9] While the rule is usually viewed in the context of statutory construction, its foundations are based on broader concerns such as fair notice, due process, and the separation of powers.[10]
The Supreme Court first articulated the rule of lenity in United States v. Wiltberger, where Chief Justice Marshall explained that penal laws should be strictly construed because “the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.”[11] By placing the authority to define crimes and prescribe punishments with Congress, Marshall recognized that courts should not expand the scope of criminal liability through judicial interpretation.[12] Wiltberger established two principles that are key to the lenity doctrine: (1) individuals should not be subjected to punishment absent clear legislative authorization; and (2) courts should refrain from creating crimes or punishments through expansive statutory interpretation.[13]
The rule of lenity developed alongside the legal principle of fair notice.[14] In McBoyle v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to extend a federal statute governing stolen motor vehicles to stolen airplanes, reasoning that criminal statutes should provide “fair warning . . . in language that the common world will understand.”[15] The Court’s reasoning reflected the principle that criminal statutes must provide fair warning and that the boundaries of criminal liability should be sufficiently clear as to be understood by ordinary citizens, thereby ensuring that defendants are not subjected to criminal sanctions based on unexpected judicial interpretations.[16]
The Supreme Court expanded upon these principles in United States v. Bass, which involved a federal firearm statute that could reasonably be interpreted in more than one way.[17] The ambiguity concerned whether the interstate commerce requirement modified only the word “transport” or also applied to the offenses of receipt and possession.[18] The Court resolved this ambiguity in favor of the defendant and explained that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”[19] The Court also recognized that because criminal statutes have serious consequences, Congress should bear the responsibility for defining criminal conduct rather than the courts.[20] Together, Wiltberger, McBoyle, and Bass establish that the rule of lenity involves concerns about fair notice, legislative accountability, and the protection of individual liberty.[21]
B. The Modern Narrowing of Lenity
Although the Supreme Court continues to recognize the rule of lenity, the doctrine no longer operates with the same force that it once did.[22] Modern courts generally do not apply lenity solely because a statute could have more than one reasonable interpretation.[23] Instead, courts will first use a variety of interpretive tools, such as looking to the text, structure, and purpose of the statute.[24] Courts also apply various substantive canons to determine whether a single interpretation ultimately prevails.[25]
The Supreme Court’s decision in Muscarello v. United States illustrates this shift.[26] The Court addressed whether a defendant who transported a firearm in a vehicle “carried” the firearm for purposes of a federal sentencing enhancement.[27] Even though there were conflicting statutory interpretations, the Court chose not to use the rule of lenity and instead examined dictionary definitions, statutory context, and legislative history before concluding that the statute supported the government’s interpretation.[28] Muscarello illustrates how modern courts often require a greater amount of uncertainty before invoking lenity compared to what prior courts required.[29]
The disagreement over lenity’s proper role became particularly apparent in Wooden v. United States, where the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the government’s interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act.[30] Several Justices disagreed regarding when courts should apply lenity.[31] Justice Gorsuch argued that courts should apply lenity whenever there is genuine uncertainty that remains after traditional interpretive analysis.[32] Justice Kavanaugh, however, believed that courts should invoke lenity only after exhausting all traditional interpretive tools and finding persistent ambiguity.[33] This disagreement highlights a broader debate within modern criminal jurisprudence regarding whether lenity is still a meaningful safeguard of individual liberty or is instead a doctrine that should only be used as a last resort.
III. Recent Developments
Although the rule of lenity developed as a doctrine intended to protect fair notice, legislative accountability, and individual liberty, its modern application has increasingly been used in the context of federal sentencing statutes.[34] One of the most significant developments in this area is Congress’s enactment of the First Step Act and the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of that legislation in Pulsifer v. United States.[35] Together, these developments provide the context for the Supreme Court’s most recent application of the rule of lenity and set the stage for the issues addressed in Pulsifer. Part A of this section examines the relevant statutory background, and Part B discusses the Court’s decision in Pulsifer.
A. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing and the First Step Act
Congress enacted many federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions during the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly as part of broader efforts to combat drug trafficking and violent crime.[36] These sentencing schemes generally require courts to impose a minimum term of imprisonment when the statutory conditions are met.[37] Supporters of mandatory minimum sentencing argue that such provisions promote deterrence and sentencing uniformity.[38] However, critics maintain that mandatory minimums limit judicial discretion while shifting authority to prosecutors.[39] Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018 as part of a broader effort to reform aspects of the criminal justice system.[40] The Act implemented several criminal justice reforms aimed at reducing recidivism, expanding rehabilitative opportunities, and modifying certain federal sentencing provisions.[41] One of the Act’s most significant reforms involved expanding eligibility for relief under the federal “safety valve” provision, which allows qualifying defendants convicted of certain drug offenses to avoid otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentences if they satisfy a series of statutory requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).[42] To qualify, a defendant must satisfy five statutory criteria: the defendant cannot have a disqualifying criminal history, cannot have used violence or possessed a firearm in connection with the offense, cannot have caused death or serious bodily injury, cannot have been an organizer or leader of the offense, and must truthfully provide the government with all information concerning the offense.[43]
Prior to the First Step Act, defendants could only receive safety valve relief if they had no more than one criminal history point.[44] Congress expanded eligibility by amending Section 3553(f), thereby allowing additional defendants with criminal histories to qualify for relief under specific circumstances.[45] Following the amendment, federal courts disagreed as to what the meaning of Section 3553(f)(1) was, resulting in a circuit split that ultimately reached the Supreme Court.[46]
B. Pulsifer v. United States
In Pulsifer v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the proper interpretation of Section 3553(f)(1).[47] The statute denies relief to defendants who have: “(A) more than [four] criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a [one]-point offense. . . ; (B) a prior [three]-point offense . . . ; and (C) a prior [two]-point violent offense.”[48] The dispute was ultimately about the meaning of the word “and,” which connects the three subparagraphs.[49] Pulsifer argued that a defendant becomes ineligible for safety valve relief only when all three conditions are present, meaning that the presence of any of the characteristics is sufficient to bar safety valve eligibility.[50] However, the government argued that each condition independently disqualifies a defendant, meaning that the presence of any of the characteristics is sufficient to bar safety valve eligibility.[51]
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the government’s interpretation.[52] Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan concluded that the statutory text, structure, and context supported treating each of the conditions as an independent ground for disqualification.[53] The Court also emphasized that Pulsifer’s interpretation of the statute would create surplusage within the statute and produce results that were inconsistent with the structure of the safety valve provision.[54]
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Jackson and Sotomayor, dissented, arguing that the statute’s text supported Pulsifer’s interpretation, and that any remaining ambiguity should be resolved by using the rule of lenity.[55] According to the dissent—and the rule of lenity—courts should construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants rather than rely on policy considerations or structural inferences to impose additional punishment.[56]
In resolving the circuit split, Pulsifer clarified the scope of safety valve eligibility under the First Step Act, while also adding to the Supreme Court’s recent body of cases addressing the role of lenity in criminal statutory interpretation.[57]
IV. Discussion
Although Pulsifer resolved an important question of statutory interpretation, the decision also illustrates a broader shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the rule of lenity.[58] This section argues that the Court’s modern application of the doctrine departs from the principles that historically justified its existence. Part A argues that requiring courts to exhaust increasingly complex interpretive tools before invoking lenity weakens the doctrine’s role in protecting fair notice, legislative accountability, and individual liberty. Part B argues that narrowing lenity expands prosecutorial leverage by increasing defendants’ sentencing exposure during plea negotiations. Finally, Part C argues that because the empirical evidence supporting increasingly severe punishment remains inconclusive, courts should hesitate before resolving statutory ambiguity in favor of broader criminal liability or harsher punishment.
A. Modern Lenity Doctrine Undermines Fair Notice and the Legality Principle
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer emphasizes the increasing disconnect between the original purposes of the rule of lenity and its modern application.[59] As mentioned before, the rule of lenity was originally developed as a doctrine to protect fair notice, preserve legislative control over criminal punishment, and ensure that defendants do not bear the cost of statutory ambiguity.[60] Despite these historical foundations, modern courts rarely allow ambiguity to survive long enough for lenity to operate.[61] Instead, courts have increasingly relied on structural canons, policy considerations, and contextual analysis to choose a preferred interpretation before actually using the rule of lenity.[62]
Pulsifer is a clear example of this modern trend.[63] The dispute produced a circuit split, divided the Supreme Court, and generated competing interpretations of the same statutory language, but the majority still found that the statute’s structure and context eliminated any ambiguity that might have justified lenity.[64] The existence of multiple reasonable interpretations raises an important question: at what point does ambiguity become sufficient to trigger the rule of lenity? If there is a disagreement among multiple federal courts and several members of the Supreme Court, and the rule of lenity is still not invoked, then the rule risks becoming largely symbolic. When courts resolve uncertainty through complex interpretive tools, they shift the consequences of legislative imprecision from Congress to criminal defendants, which contradicts the exact reason of why the rule of lenity was created in the first place. Modern doctrine unfairly places the risk of imprecision on defendants, who may face multiple years of their life being taken away based on judicial decisions regarding statutory structure rather than clear legislative text.
For this reason, Pulsifer is significant not just because it narrowed safety valve eligibility, but because it demonstrates how difficult it can be for defendants to invoke the rule of lenity in modern criminal cases.[65] While the Supreme Court still recognizes the doctrine, its role appears increasingly limited wherever courts can identify a structural or contextual basis for selecting a harsher interpretation of a statute.
B. Restricting Lenity Expands Prosecutorial Leverage
One consequence of the Court’s modern approach to lenity is that it may increase the leverage that prosecutors hold during plea negotiations. Because the rule of lenity determines who bears the consequences of statutory ambiguity, limiting its application in sentencing cases may expose more defendants to mandatory minimum penalties.[66] When a court adopts a broad interpretation of a criminal statute, defendants may face a significant risk of longer sentences, while prosecutors gain a stronger bargaining position.[67] This is particularly significant in cases involving mandatory minimum sentences, where, unlike advisory sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums restrict a judge’s ability to impose a lower sentence based on the individualized facts of each case.[68] As a result, the availability of sentencing relief becomes one of the few meaningful ways a defendant can reduce their exposure to lengthy sentences.[69]
Viewed in this light, the dispute in Pulsifer involved more than the meaning of a single statutory provision.[70] Under Pulsifer’s proposed interpretation of the statute, a larger group of defendants would still be eligible for safety valve relief and would therefore avoid mandatory minimum sentences, but the majority’s interpretation produced the exact opposite result, leaving a greater number of defendants subject to mandatory minimum penalties.[71] This distinction extends beyond sentencing because a defendant who faces a mandatory minimum sentence enters plea negotiations from a fundamentally different position than one who remains eligible for safety valve relief.[72] The risk of a lengthy mandatory sentence may create substantial pressure to accept a negotiated deal rather than proceed to trial. Consequently, decisions that narrow the eligibility for sentencing relief may indirectly strengthen prosecutorial bargaining power even when the court is deciding a question of statutory interpretation.[73] When courts instead resolve ambiguity in favor of broader punishment, the effects go beyond the individual defendant and may alter the balance of power within the criminal justice system by increasing the leverage prosecutors possess in similar cases.
C. The Empirical Basis for Expanding Punishment Through Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
Supporters of mandatory minimum sentencing have traditionally justified such penalties on three grounds: deterrence, incapacitation, and sentencing uniformity.[74] Mandatory minimums are intended to discourage criminal conduct by increasing the consequences of offending, remove dangerous offenders from society for extended periods of time, and reduce disparities by ensuring similarly situated offenders receive comparable punishments.[75] While these goals are undoubtedly legitimate government interests, the difficulty lies in determining whether increasingly severe punishment actually advances those objectives.
While the relationship between punishment and deterrence has long been debated, modern empirical research shows mixed results regarding the effectiveness of lengthy incarceration.[76] Numerous studies suggest that the certainty of punishment is a greater deterrent effect than the severity of punishment itself.[77] According to the National Institute of Justice, research consistently demonstrates that offenders are more responsive to the likelihood of being caught than to the possibility of receiving a longer sentence.[78] As a result, increasing the length of incarceration may not produce the same deterrent benefits as improving the certainty and swiftness of punishment.
Research concerning recidivism has produced similarly mixed findings.[79] While incarceration incapacitates offenders during their sentence, studies have questioned whether longer prison sentences meaningfully reduce future criminal conduct after release.[80] Research also suggests that longer periods of incarceration may reduce recidivism for specific categories of offenders.[81] The United States Sentencing Commission has likewise reported that recidivism rates are influenced by a multitude of factors, including age and criminal history, making it difficult to conclude that sentence length alone substantially reduces recidivism.[82]
These findings do not establish that mandatory minimums are ineffective in every circumstance.[83] Some scholars have argued that incarceration reduces crime through incapacitation by preventing offenders from committing additional crimes while imprisoned.[84] Others have argued that severe penalties may deter circumstance-specific offenders, particularly those who engage in calculated criminal conduct and have the opportunity to weigh potential consequences before acting.[85] Together, the empirical evidence does not support a conclusion that harsher punishment never advances legitimate criminal justice objectives.[86]
At the same time, the available research does not provide a clear consensus that increasingly severe punishment consistently produces better outcomes. Scholars continue to debate the extent to which longer prison sentences reduce recidivism, improve deterrence, or enhance public safety.[87] This continuing disagreement is significant because the rule of lenity operates in circumstances where uncertainty already exists.[88] Lenity does not require courts to determine whether harsher punishment is good or bad policy.[89] Rather, it asks who should bear the consequences when Congress leaves uncertainty in a criminal statute.[90]
If the benefits of severe punishment were universally accepted, courts might be more comfortable resolving ambiguity in favor of broader incarceration. However, the existing research paints a far more complicated picture, and because of this, courts should exercise caution before interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in a manner that increases punishment. The question is not whether mandatory minimums can serve legitimate purposes, but who should bear the cost when both the statutory text and the empirical evidence remain subject to reasonable debate. The traditional answer provided by the rule of lenity was that defendants should not lose their liberty because of unresolved uncertainty, but modern courts seem to be going in a different direction.[91]
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer is more than a dispute over the interpretation of a single statute.[92] It symbolizes the continued erosion of the rule of lenity and the Supreme Court’s increasing willingness to resolve statutory ambiguity through expansive interpretive methodologies before affording defendants the benefit of the doubt.[93] In doing so, the modern application of lenity departs from the doctrine’s original role of protecting fair notice, preserving legislative accountability, and safeguarding individual liberty.[94] This shift has also has practical consequences of exposing more defendants to mandatory minimum sentences, strengthening prosecutorial leverage during plea negotiations, and placing the burden of legislative uncertainty on those whose liberty is at stake.[95] Further, because the empirical evidence supporting increasingly severe punishment is inconclusive, there is little justification for resolving statutory ambiguity in favor of broader criminal liability or harsher punishment.[96] If the rule of lenity is no longer applied in cases involving genuine uncertainty, its continued recognition as a meaningful protection within American criminal law becomes increasingly difficult to justify.
*B.A., University of Missouri, 2023; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2027; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2026-2027. I am grateful to the Missouri Law Review for its guidance, support, and help in the editing process.
[1] Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 152–53 (2024).
[2] United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
[3] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
[4] See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 152–53.
[5] See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (describing the rule that penal laws are strictly construed as “perhaps not much less old than construction itself”).
[6] See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 152–53.
[7] See Shon Hopwood, Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 918, 921 (2020).
[8] See Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95 (describing the rule that penal laws are strictly construed as “perhaps not much less old than construction itself”).
[9] United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
[10] See Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95 (1820) (explaining that the rule of lenity rests on the “principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (explaining that lenity is founded on the principles of fair warning and that legislatures, rather than courts, should define criminal activity).
[11] Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95.
[12] Id.
[13] See id. at 95–96.
[14] See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
[15] Id.
[16] See id.
[17] United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337–40 (1971).
[18] Id. at 339.
[19] Id. at 347 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
[20] Id.at 348.
[21] See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820); McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27; Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
[22] See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1990).
[23] Id. at 108.
[24] Id.
[25] See Valerie C. Brannon, Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends, Cong. Rsch. Serv., 47–48 (2023) (explaining that when a statute has multiple meanings, substantive canons “may tip the scale toward a particular result”).
[26] See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998).
[27] Id. at 126–27.
[28] See id. at 127–39.
[29] See id. at 138–39 (explaining how lenity applies only if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994)).
[30] Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 363 (2022).
[31] Id. at 376–97.
[32] Id. at 395.
[33] Id. at 377.
[34] See, e.g., Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 152–53 (2024) (considering and rejecting the defendant’s rule of lenity argument in interpreting a federal sentencing safety valve provision).
[35] See generally id.;First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
[36] See Chapter Two: History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties and Statutory Relief Mechanisms, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 22–23 (2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf
[37] See 21 U.S.C § 841(b); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Drug Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System, at10 (2017). https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf.
[38] See 2011 Report to the Congress, supra note 34, at 85–87.
[39] See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 13 (2010).
[40] See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
[41] Id.
[42] Id. § 402; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
[43] See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
[44] See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (West 2010).
[45] Compare First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402(a), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) by replacing the requirement that a defendant have no more than one criminal history point with broader criminal-history eligibility criteria), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (West 2010).
[46] See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 132 (2024). Compare United States v. Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018 (8th Cir. 2022), with United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
[47] Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 130–32.
[48] Id. at 129; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).
[49] Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 131.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id. at 132.
[53] Id. at 132–40.
[54] Id. at 142–43.
[55] Id. at 184–85.
[56] Id.
[57] Id. at 124.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (explaining that the rule of lenity rests on the principle that the power to punish is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department).
[61] Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1990).
[62] Id.
[63] Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 124.
[64] Id. at 128–32.
[65] Id. at 124.
[66] See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2548 (2004).
[67] See id.
[68] See id. (arguing that expansive criminal laws provide prosecutors with numerous charging options, enabling them to exert substantial influence over plea bargaining outcomes).
[69] See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 35, at 7–11.
[70] See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 124.
[71] Id. at 128–132.
[72] Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012).
[73] U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 35, at 7–11.
[74] See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 34,at 85–88.
[75] Id.
[76] Five Things About Deterrence, Nat’l Inst. of Just. (June 5, 2016), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf.
[77] Id.
[78] Id.
[79] See generally Jeremy Travis et al., The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences(Nat’l Acads. Press 2014).
[80] See id.
[81] See generally U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Length of Incarceration and Recidivism (2022), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2022/20220621_Recidivsm-SentLength.pdf.
[82] See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, The Effects of Aging on Recidivism Among Federal Offenders, at 3 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20171207_Recidivism-Age.pdf.
[83] See Travis et al., supra note 77, 130–44.
[84] Id.
[85] U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 34, at 85–88.
[86] See id.; Travis et al., supra note 77, at 130–44.
[87] See Daniel S. Nagin, Incarceration and Public Safety, Arnold Ventures (July 2020).
[88] See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (explaining that lenity applies only when statutory uncertainty remains after using interpretive tools).
[89] See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820).
[90] See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
[91] See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138–39 (requiring “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” before applying lenity).
[92] See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024).
[93] See id.
[94] See Hopwood, supra note 5, 918 (2020).
[95] See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 124; Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012); Stuntz, supra note 64.
[96] See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 34, at 85–88; Travis et al., supra note 77,at 130–44.