Published on Aug. 23, 2024
In Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School, teacher Lonnie Billard filed a lawsuit against his former employer for sex discrimination under Title VII after being fired for intending to marry his same-sex partner. The district court initially ruled in favor of Lonnie Billard, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit later reversed this decision after considering the ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws.
By: Meg Morris
Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., 101 F.4th 316 (4th Cir. 2024).
I. Introduction
Lonnie Billard, an experienced English and drama teacher filed a lawsuit for sex discrimination under Title VII against his former employer, Charlotte Catholic High School (“CCHS”). Billard’s employer fired him for his intention to marry his same-sex partner. The district court granted the teacher’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the school’s motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit retained discretion to consider the ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws sua sponte even though CCHS waived the exception. The court held Billard, as a key representative of CCHS’s faith, was subject to the ministerial exception under Title VII. The court reversed the district court’s order with instructions to enter judgment for CCHS.
II. Facts and Holding
CCHS operates within the Mecklenburg Area Catholic Schools system, which the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte (“the Diocese”) manages.[1] CCHS provides both secular and religious classes, but religious principles are a foundation of daily life.[2] The school defines its mission statement as “an educational community centered in the Roman Catholic faith which teaches individuals to serve as Christians in our changing world.”[3] The belief system asserts that individuals should embody and incorporate Jesus’ teachings in all aspects of their conduct to foster faith and inspire action.[4]
CCHS sees teachers as vital to the school’s mission.[5] Teachers of all classes, secular and nonsecular, are expected to start each class with a short prayer, led by either themselves or the students. They attend all-school Masses, where they play a supervisory rather than a specifically religious role.[6] Teachers are evaluated on their ability to create a Catholic environment in their classrooms, align their teaching with Catholic thought, contribute to a faith-filled atmosphere, and implement the school’s and Diocese’s missions.[7] CCHS’s expectations for its teachers also extend beyond the classroom.[8] Employees may not be Catholic, but they are required to adhere to Catholic teachings.[9] And these teachings reject same-sex marriage.[10]
Lonnie Billard began as a substitute teacher at CCHS in the spring of 2001, transitioned to full-time teaching the following year, and returned to substitute teaching in 2012.[11] He taught drama and English and occasionally covered religion classes.[12] Although his main subjects did not require him to teach Catholic doctrine directly, Billard integrated religious elements into his lessons.[13] For example, he collaborated with religion teachers when teaching Romeo and Juliet to ensure the lessons aligned with Catholic teachings.[14]
Billard, who is gay, announced his engagement to his partner in 2014.[15] After learning of Billard’s engagement, CCHS decided not to rehire him, citing his plan to marry a same-sex partner as a violation of the Diocese’s policy against conduct contrary to Catholic moral teachings.[16]
In 2017, Billard initiated legal proceedings against CCHS, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.[17] CCHS agreed to waive the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which allows religious institutions to discriminate in employment decisions involving employees with significant religious roles.[18] During discovery, both parties sought summary judgment.[19] CCHS defended itself using four primary defenses: Title VII’s religious exemption, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the “church autonomy” doctrine, and the First Amendment freedom of association.[20]
The district court granted Billard’s motion for summary judgment and denied CCHS’s defenses.[21] It first found that CCHS terminated Billard’s employment due to his intention to marry his same-sex partner, and this action constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.[22] As for CCHS’s affirmative defenses, the court dismissed their reliance on Title VII’s religious exemption, emphasizing that it applies to only religious discrimination, not sex discrimination.[23] The court also rejected CCHS’s RFRA defense because RFRA does not extend to disputes between private parties.[24] Additionally, the court denied CCHS’s First Amendment defenses, ruling the church autonomy doctrine and freedom of association did not exempt it from Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions.[25] But, despite CCHS’s waiver, the court addressed the ministerial exception, determining it did not apply because Billard did not meet the criteria established by the United States Supreme Court.[26] Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment to Billard, and CCHS appealed.[27]
While CCHS waived its right to invoke the ministerial exception as a defense in the district court, the Fourth Circuit addressed the exception, citing structural concerns and prudential reasons.[28] Normally, waivers are binding and prevent appellate courts from considering the argument.[29] However, due to the exceptional nature of the ministerial exception, which is deeply rooted in constitutional principles concerning the separation of church and state, the court asserted its discretion to address the issue.[30] The court prioritized resolving statutory defenses before constitutional ones as a matter of prudential judicial practice.[31] The court reasoned that these defenses, if accepted, would have wide-ranging implications beyond the specific facts of this case, potentially affecting a broad spectrum of employees at religious institutions.[32] In contrast, the ministerial exception is a well-established constitutional doctrine that is narrowly tailored to cases involving employees with ministerial roles.[33]
Next, the court evaluated whether Billard qualified for the ministerial exception.[34] The court referenced the Supreme Court cases Hosanna-Tabor v. E.E.O.C. and Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, which were pivotal in defining the scope of the ministerial exception.[35] In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court emphasized that job function, not just formal titles or extensive theological training, determined ministerial status.[36] This perspective was further endorsed in Our Lady of Guadalupe, where lay teachers without formal religious titles could qualify under the exception if they performed vital religious duties integral to the school’s mission.[37] Applying these precedents, the Fourth Circuit examined Billard’s role at CCHS.[38] Despite teaching secular subjects like English and drama, Billard integrated Catholic teachings into his curriculum, ensuring his classes were consistent with Catholic values.[39] He initiated prayers, attended Mass with students, and occasionally filled in for religion classes, demonstrating a commitment to the school’s religious mission.[40] While he did not provide regular religious instruction like the teachers in Our Lady of Guadalupe, the court found his role sufficiently analogous due to the influence of Catholic faith in all aspects of CCHS’s educational mission.[41] Thus, the court held that the ministerial exception applied to Billard.[42] It reversed the district court’s judgement and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for CCHS.[43]
III. Legal Background
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of various protected characteristics such as sex, race, national origin, and religion.[44] To bring a discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must have suffered an adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[45] The ministerial exception, an exception to Title VII, safeguards the autonomy of religious organizations in their employment decisions concerning certain religious positions.[46]
The Supreme Court first set forth the ministerial exception framework in Hosanna-Tabor.[47] The Court examined the case of Cheryl Perich, a teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.[48] Perich was designated as a “called” teacher, a role that required formal religious training and a commissioning as a minister.[49] She taught both secular and religious subjects, conducted prayers and devotions, and occasionally presided over chapel services.[50] When Perich developed a medical condition that the school deemed incompatible with her duties, she threatened legal action, and the school terminated her employment for insubordination.[51] The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intervened, arguing that Perich was dismissed in retaliation for asserting her rights.[52]
The Court upheld the school’s decision under the ministerial exception.[53] The Court emphasized that Perich’s role as a commissioned minister was central to her position, despite her performance of secular duties and the presence of lay teachers who performed similar religious functions.[54] The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor underscored that the ministerial exception extends beyond mere hiring and firing decisions; it protects the fundamental right of religious institutions to select and manage individuals who serve important religious functions.[55] This decision affirmed that the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom includes the right of religious organizations to make employment decisions regarding their ministers without interference from secular authorities.
The Court reaffirmed the ministerial exception in 2020 in Our Lady of Guadalupe.[56] Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru, a teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, filed an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.[57] The district court ruled in favor of the school, invoking the ministerial exception established in Hosanna-Tabor.[58] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court, determining that Morrissey-Berru did not qualify as a minister.[59] Despite teaching a course on the history of the Catholic Church, she lacked formal religious credentials, training, or ministerial background.[60] She did not hold herself out publicly as a religious leader or minister, leading the court to reject her classification under the ministerial exception.[61]
The Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception and identified four factors guiding the determination of ministerial status, though it declined to establish a rigid formula.[62] Central to the exception was whether the employee’s role fulfilled a religious function critical to the institution’s mission.[63] Educating students in their faith was deemed foundational to the school’s mission, qualifying Morrissey-Berru for the exception.[64]
V. Comment
The concurrence in Billard argued that the majority’s decision to apply the ministerial exception was unnecessary from a constitutional standpoint.[65] It contended that a straightforward application of general employment law could have resolved the discrimination claims without delving into constitutional issues.[66] This perspective suggests that the Court could have relied on existing legal frameworks and statutory interpretations instead of expanding the scope of the ministerial exception.[67]
The intentions of the Court in deciding to apply the ministerial exception were complex. The majority reasoned that applying general employment laws to teachers in religious schools could pose significant challenges and could excessively entangle the judiciary in internal religious matters.[68] By broadly interpreting the ministerial exception, the Court aimed to uphold the autonomy of religious organizations in selecting employees who play crucial roles in advancing their religious mission.[69] But categorizing almost all teachers in religious schools under the exception could be considered overly expansive. It could potentially erode the protections originally intended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.[70] The decision suggests that virtually any teacher at a religious school, particularly those involved in imparting religious education or fostering faith-based values, could fall under the ministerial exception. This broad application raises questions about whether the exception extends too far beyond its intended scope.
Balancing the rights of religious organizations to maintain their religious identity and the individual rights of employees is at the center of this debate.[71] On one hand, religious institutions argue that the ability to hire and retain employees who uphold their faith-based principles is essential to their religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.[72] On the other hand, employees argue that being classified under the ministerial exception could potentially strip them of crucial employment protections and expose them to discrimination based on characteristics unrelated to their job performance.[73]
While the Court’s decision in Our Lady of Guadalupe reinforces the autonomy of religious organizations, it also highlights the tension between religious liberty and anti-discrimination protections. The expansive application of the ministerial exception to include a wide array of teachers at religious schools prompts critical examination of whether this approach strikes a fair balance between competing rights and interests and whether it aligns with the original intent of Title VII.
[1] Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., 101 F.4th 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2024).
[2] Id. at 320
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 321.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. The Diocese’s mission statement reads:
“We, the people of God in the Diocese of Charlotte, fortified in the Father, redeemed in the Son, empowered in the Spirit, are called to grow ever more perfectly into a community of praise, worship, and witness. We seek to become evermore enthusiastically a leaven of service and a sign of peace through love in Piedmont and Western North Carolina.”
Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 321–22.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 322.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 323.
[24] Id.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 325.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 326.
[31] Id. at 327.
[32] Id.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 329.
[35] Id. at 330; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020).
[36] Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
[37] Our Lady of Guadalupe, 591 U.S. at 757.
[38] Billard, 101 F.4th at 331.
[39] Id. at 332.
[40] Id. at 333.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
[45] Townsend v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 3d 280, 309 (D.D.C. 2017).
[46] See Rachel Barrick, The Ministerial Exception: Seeking Clarity and Precision Amid Inconsistent Application of the Hosanna-Tabor Framework, 70 Emory L. J. 465, 467 (2020).
[47] See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church, 565 U.S. 171; Rachel Barrick, The Ministerial Exception: Seeking Clarity and Precision Amid Inconsistent Application of
the Hosanna-Tabor Framework, 70 Emory L. J. 465, at 477 (2020).
[48] Id. at 178.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] Id. at 179.
[53] Id. at 194.
[54] Id.
[55] Id.
[56] Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020).
[57] Id. at 732–33.
[58] Id. at 742.
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] Id. at 752.
[63] Id.
[64] Id. at 753–54.
[65] Billard v. Charlotte Cath. High Sch., 101 F.4th 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2024) (King, J., concurring in part).
[66] Id. at 335.
[67] Id.
[68] Id. at 329 (majority opinion).
[69] Id. at 323.
[70] 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
[71] See Farhan I. Mohiuddin, Getting Paid to Discriminate: The Clash Between Religious Autonomy and Principles of Justice and Fairness, 59 Hous. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2022).
[72] Id. at 986.
[73] Id.