Published on
Updated on
In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867 (Mo. 2025)
Lucas Reed*
I. Introduction
The road to hell is paved with good intentions,[1] especially when it comes to criminal justice reform. Section 547.031 (“prosecutorial relief statute”) of the Revised Statutes of Missouri allows circuit attorneys to file motions vacating convictions based on innocence evidence—an ambitious reform that In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn reveals as fundamentally flawed.[2] Christopher Dunn’s case should have provided a straightforward exoneration after three decades of wrongful imprisonment.[3] Instead, the statute created a procedural nightmare with conflicting state authorities, unclear appellate rights, and extended litigation over basic governmental power.[4] Dunn languished in legal limbo while different arms of the same state government fought over his fate—the circuit attorney seeking his freedom, the Attorney General fighting to keep him imprisoned.[5]
This Note argues that Missouri’s prosecutor-initiated relief statute creates more problems than it solves. The statute created a framework that is more complex, less efficient, and potentially less effective than the traditional post-conviction mechanisms it was meant to supplement. Part II examines the factual background and procedural posture. Part III contrasts traditional post-conviction relief mechanisms with Section 547.031’s structural departures, revealing three critical flaws: governmental conflict, procedural uncertainty, and problematic reliance on prosecutorial discretion. Part IV reviews the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, while Part V demonstrates why the statute fails to achieve its stated goals and proposes superior alternatives.
II. Facts and Holding
Christopher Dunn was convicted in 1991 of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.[6] In 2024, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney filed a motion under Section 547.031, arguing that newly discovered evidence established Dunn’s innocence by clear and convincing evidence.[7] The Attorney General opposed the motion.[8] The court granted the motion, vacating Dunn’s conviction and ordering his immediate release.[9]
The State of Missouri, represented by the Attorney General, sought to appeal the circuit court’s decision.[10] The circuit attorney moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the State had no right to appeal under the prosecutorial relief statute.[11] The Missouri Supreme Court held that the State possessed appellate rights under Section 512.020(5) as an “aggrieved party,” rejecting arguments that the prosecutorial relief statute constituted a “special statutory proceeding” that limited the State’s right to appeal.[12]
III. Legal Background
A. Traditional Post-Conviction Relief
Prior to Section 547.031, Missouri’s post-conviction relief system operated through four primary mechanisms (which remain available legal routes in addition to the new one provided by the prosecutorial relief statute).[13] Under Section 552.020, defendants may file habeas corpus petitions challenging the legality of their confinement.[14] Missouri courts also recognize motions to address constitutional violations or jurisdictional issues.[15] Defendants may also file a motion for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” but must do so within fifteen days of returning a verdict.[16] Additionally, Section 547.035 provides a specific procedure for post-conviction DNA testing when biological evidence exists.[17]
These traditional mechanisms share common structural characteristics. Defendants bear the burden of initiating proceedings and proving their claims, typically by a preponderance of the evidence.[18] The state, represented by the jurisdiction’s prosecutor, opposes relief motions through adversarial proceedings.[19] Courts then issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented in the motion, applying Rule 78.07(c) to the proceedings.[20] An order on the motion filed under the provisions of Rule 29.15 is considered a final judgment for purposes of appeal, and appellate review of this action is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous.[21]
B. Modernizing Approaches to Post-Conviction Relief
Missouri enacted Section 547.031 in response to structural barriers that prevented the correction of wrongful convictions.[22] The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Johnson revealed a critical gap in Missouri’s post-conviction system: prosecuting attorneys had no mechanism to vacate convictions despite having information that a convicted person might be innocent.[23] The statute authorizes circuit attorneys to file motions seeking to vacate convictions when “evidence of innocence that was not available or not disclosed at the time of conviction establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the person is innocent.”[24] Circuit attorneys must demonstrate that the evidence is reliable, was not previously available, and establishes innocence by clear and convincing evidence.[25]
Under section 547.031, circuit attorneys may file motions without defendant consent or participation.[26] The statute establishes specific procedural requirements, including notice to victims and opportunity for hearing.[27] However, Section 547.031 does not explicitly address several procedural questions, including the relationship between circuit attorney relief motions and Attorney General appellate authority.[28]
Missouri is not alone in establishing prosecutor-initiated relief, but other jurisdictions have adopted different approaches that avoid some of Section 547.031’s structural problems. Illinois’s Attorney General, with the power already vested within the office, established a Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) to investigate claims of actual innocence where new evidence has been discovered or where new technologies now exist to test or retest remaining evidence.[29] The CIU conducts investigations, independent from the rest of the Office of the Attorney General, to determine innocence.[30] Upon a finding that there is a substantial probability of innocence, the CIU then recommends that the Attorney General, in conjunction with the state’s attorney from the county of the conviction, seek relief from the conviction.[31] North Carolina created the Innocence Inquiry Commission (“IIC”), an independent state agency with authority to investigate innocence claims and recommend relief to courts.[32] If the IIC concludes that there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence, the district attorney and the convicted person’s counsel may agree to judicial review by a three judge panel.[33]
These comparative examples demonstrate that prosecutor-initiated relief can be achieved without the governmental conflicts and procedural confusion that characterize Missouri’s approach. The key difference lies in institutional design: other jurisdictions create independent oversight mechanisms, while Missouri’s statute fractures state authority between circuit attorneys and the Attorney General.
C. Appellate Rights and Governmental Authority
Missouri’s traditional post-conviction proceedings operate within established appellate frameworks.[34] Section 512.020 grants appellate rights to the state when it qualifies as an “aggrieved party,” meaning the judgment operates “prejudicially and directly” on state interests.[35] Courts apply this standard uniformly across different types of post-conviction proceedings.[36] The Attorney General typically represents state interests in appellate proceedings, maintaining unified governmental representation.[37]
Section 547.031’s interaction with existing appellate frameworks remained unclear until Dunn.[38] The statute grants circuit attorneys authority to seek relief but does not explicitly address whether such proceedings constitute “special statutory proceedings” under Section 512.020 that have modified appellate rights.[39] The statute also does not resolve potential conflicts between circuit attorney relief efforts and Attorney General appellate authority.[40] These procedural ambiguities distinguished Section 547.031 from both traditional post-conviction mechanisms and approaches adopted in other jurisdictions.
IV. Instant Decision
In Dunn, the court held that the State of Missouri possessed appellate rights under Section 512.020(5) as an “aggrieved party” because the circuit court’s judgment vacating Dunn’s conviction operated “prejudicially and directly” on the State’s interests in the finality of its criminal judgments.[41] The court rejected arguments that the prosecutorial relief statute constituted a “special statutory proceeding” that limited appellate rights, distinguishing it from statutes that comprehensively regulate all aspects of “special” case types.[42]
Judge Powell’s dissent argued that the statute does constitute a special statutory proceeding that limits appellate rights, noting that the text of the statute grants explicit rights to circuit attorneys while remaining silent about Attorney General appeal rights.[43] This interpretive dispute demonstrates the statute’s ambiguous relationship to existing procedural frameworks.[44] The majority’s holding preserves traditional adversarial procedures while accommodating the statute’s prosecutor-initiated framework but arguably undermines the efficiency Section 547.031 was designed to provide.[45]
V. Comment
Dunn demonstrates that Section 547.031 has produced results opposite to its intended purpose.[46] The statute was designed to streamline relief for wrongfully convicted individuals, but Dunn revealed how it lengthened rather than shortened the path to relief, transforming what should have been a straightforward exoneration into years of procedural litigation.[47]
A. How Missouri’s Prosecutorial Relief Law Failed to Shorten Relief Proceedings
The procedural timeline in Dunn illustrates how Section 547.031 fails to achieve its efficiency goals. Christopher Dunn was convicted in 1991.[48] The St. Louis Circuit Attorney filed a Section 547.031 motion in February 2024.[49] The circuit court granted relief in July 2024 after finding clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence.[50] However, instead of ending the proceedings, this relief triggered additional litigation that continued until the Supreme Court’s decision in April 2025—over a year after the circuit court found Dunn innocent.[51]
Under traditional post-conviction mechanisms, the Attorney General’s appellate opposition would be expected and procedurally straightforward. Defendants understand they face adversarial proceedings with potential appeals, and the system provides predictable timelines and procedures.[52] By contrast, Section 547.031 created the false expectation that prosecutorial involvement would streamline relief while actually ensuring that such relief faces the same appellate obstacles as traditional mechanisms.
The statute’s design exacerbates procedural delays in several ways. First, it creates a two-stage adversarial process: circuit attorneys must first convince courts to grant relief, then the State can appeal that relief, requiring duplicate litigation of the same innocence claims.[53] Second, the statute’s unclear appellate provisions require additional litigation over basic jurisdictional questions, as demonstrated by the need for Supreme Court resolution in Dunn.[54] Third, the Attorney General’s opposition to circuit attorney relief efforts necessitates expensive duplicate legal representation and conflicting state positions that confuse proceedings and delay resolution.[55]
Traditional post-conviction mechanisms, while sometimes criticized for creating barriers, at least provide predictable procedures with clear resolution paths. Section 547.031 promises efficiency while delivering additional complexity, creating a longer rather than shorter path to relief for wrongfully convicted individuals.
B. Governmental Conflict and Resource Waste
The governmental conflict inherent in Section 547.031’s structure ensures that relief efforts face systematic opposition, negating any efficiency gains from prosecutorial involvement.[56] In Dunn, Missouri taxpayers simultaneously funded both the circuit attorney’s effort to free Dunn and the Attorney General’s effort to keep him imprisoned—a wasteful contradiction that could undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system.[57]
This conflict extends beyond mere resource waste to create substantive procedural problems. When different state agencies take opposing positions on the same legal question, courts face the unusual situation of adjudicating intragovernmental disputes rather than traditional adversarial proceedings between the state and defendants.[58] This confusion can delay proceedings, complicate legal analysis, and undermine the clarity that effective legal systems require.
The Missouri Supreme Court’s holding that the State retains appellate rights further undermines the statute’s efficiency goals.[59] Circuit attorneys seeking relief must now anticipate not only trial court proceedings but also appellate opposition from their own state government. This anticipation may make prosecutors more conservative in relief decisions, ultimately limiting the statute’s effectiveness.[60] Prosecutors may decline to file relief motions in close cases to avoid public criticism for being “soft on crime” or to preserve resources for other prosecutorial duties.[61]
C. Problematic Reliance on Prosecutorial Discretion
Section 547.031’s reliance on prosecutorial discretion creates the potential for geographic disparities that violate equal-access-to-justice principles.[62] The statute provides no institutional support or guidance for prosecutors undertaking conviction reviews, requiring circuit attorneys to conduct complex innocence investigations while managing regular caseloads, potentially compromising both functions. This could create a system where wrongfully convicted individuals in reform-minded jurisdictions may receive thorough reviews while those in more conservative jurisdictions face complete inaction.
Political pressures on elected prosecutors further compromise effectiveness.[63] Prosecutors acknowledging wrongful convictions may face criticism for admitting error or appearing “soft on crime.”[64] These considerations influence discretionary decisions about which cases to review, introducing inappropriate factors into objective innocence determinations.
D. Alternatives to Section 547.031
Rather than continuing Section 547.031’s ineffective approach, Missouri should pursue proven alternatives that address the statute’s structural problems.
Missouri could expand its DNA testing statute to cover all types of newly discovered evidence, preserving familiar procedures while broadening access to relief.[65] The state could also strengthen habeas corpus procedures by extending time limitations for compelling innocence claims and establishing expedited review procedures for cases with strong evidence of innocence.[66] These reforms would maintain coherent governmental structure and clear procedural boundaries that Section 547.031 lacks.
For systematic conviction review, Missouri could establish an independent Conviction Review Board with retired judges, experienced defense attorneys, and forensic experts.[67] This institutional approach would eliminate political pressures compromising prosecutorial discretion while ensuring consistent, accountable oversight. The board could review cases based on objective criteria rather than prosecutorial discretion, ensuring equal access to review across all jurisdictions. Other states have demonstrated effective alternatives that achieve the goals Section 547.031 promised without the structural problems that plague Missouri’s experiment.[68]
VI. Conclusion
Dunn demonstrates that Section 547.031 has failed to achieve its stated goals of streamlining relief for wrongfully convicted individuals. Instead, the statute has created governmental conflicts, procedural confusion, and additional barriers to relief. The case transformed a straightforward exoneration into years of litigation while wasting taxpayer resources on intragovernmental disputes.[69]
The road to hell is indeed paved with good intentions, and Missouri’s prosecutor-initiated relief statute exemplifies how well-meaning reforms can harm those they seek to help. By fracturing state authority, creating procedural uncertainty, and relying on prosecutorial discretion, the statute has produced a system that is less efficient, less predictable, and less fair than the mechanisms it was meant to supplement. Dunn illustrates these structural flaws in operation, showing how an innovative reform designed to help wrongfully convicted individuals can harm them through increased complexity and delay.[70]
Missouri should pursue alternatives that better serve justice by expanding existing post-conviction mechanisms or establishing an independent conviction review board. These approaches would provide institutional support and clear procedural frameworks that Section 547.031 lacks while ultimately better serving both the justice system and the wrongfully convicted individuals it seeks to help.
* B.S., Murray State University, 2018; M.B.A., Murray State University, 2023; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2026; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2025–2026. I am grateful to Christy Hoffman, William Perryman, and Rachel Carlson for their help in the editing process.
[1] 1 Johann Jacob Rambach, Meditations and Contemplations on the Sufferings of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ 61 (New York, J. Low 1811) (“The road to hell is paved with good resolutions.”).
[2] The statute reads, in relevant part:
1. A prosecuting or circuit attorney . . . may file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time if he or she has information that the convicted person may be innocent or may have been erroneously convicted.
* * * * *
4. The prosecuting attorney or circuit attorney shall have the authority and right to file and maintain an appeal of the denial or disposal of such a motion. The attorney general may file a motion to intervene and, in addition to such motion, file a motion to dismiss the motion to vacate or to set aside the judgment in any appeal filed by the prosecuting or circuit attorney.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.031 (2022); In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867 (Mo. 2025).
[3] Kenya Brumfield-Young, Push to Put Christopher Dunn Back in Prison Erodes Confidence in Missouri Justice System, Mo. Indep. (Apr. 17, 2025), https://missouriindependent.com/2025/04/17/effort-to-keep-christopher-dunn-incarcerated-erodes-confidence-in-missouri-justice-system/.
[4] Dunn, 708 S.W.3d at 871.
[5] Brumfield-Young, supra note 3.
[6] In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Mo. 2025).
[7] Id. The newly discovered evidence was recantations of two witnesses’ testimonies, both of which stated they were coerced by police and prosecutors. See Debra Chandler Landis, Missouri Judge Overturns Wrongful Conviction of Christopher Dunn After 33 Years in Prison, Mo. Indep. (July 22, 2024), https://missouriindependent.com/briefs/missouri-judge-overturns-wrongful-conviction-of-christopher-dunn-after-30-years-in-prison/.
[8] Id.
[9] Dunn, 708 S.W.3d at 869.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 869–70.
[12] Id. at 868.
[13] Infra, notes 14–17.
[14] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.020 (2022); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 91 (2022) (habeas relief).
[15] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (2023) (conviction after trial); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (2023) (conviction after guilty plea).
[16] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.11(b) (2022).
[17] Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035 (2022).
[18] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(i) (2023); but see State v. Hankins, 599 S.W.2d 950 (Mo. App. S.D. 1980) (defendant must show that newly discovered evidence would probably produce different result at new trial); Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2002) (permits consideration of newly discovered evidence after the rule’s deadline that completely exonerates a defendant).
[19] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(c) (2022).
[20] Id. at (j).
[21] Id. at (k).
[22] Charles Atwell & Lindsay Runnels, An Alliance for Justice: The Exoneration of Kevin Strickland, 46 The Champion 10, 17 (Apr. 2022).
[23] State v. Johnson, 617 S.W.3d 439, 444–45 (Mo. banc 2021) (prosecutor lacked legal authority to act upon evidence of a defendant’s innocence).
[24] Id.; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.031 (2022) (“A prosecuting or circuit attorney . . . may file a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment at any time if he or she has information that the convicted person may be innocent or may have been erroneously convicted.”).
[25] In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Mo. 2025).
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 870.
[29] Ill. Att’y Gen., Conviction Integrity Unit, https://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/open-and-honest-government/Conviction-Integrity-Unit/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2025).
[30] Id.
[31] Ill. Att’y Gen., Conviction Integrity Unit Charter (Mar. 2025), https://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/CIUCharter.pdf.
[32] N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1469 (2024).
[33] Id.
[34] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(k) (2022).
[35] In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Mo. 2025).
[36] Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(k) (2022); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (2022).
[37] Dunn, 708 S.W.3dat 872.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. at 874–75.
[40] Id. at 869.
[41] Id. at 871.
[42] Id. at 870–71.
[43] Id. at 874–75.
[44] Id. at 870 (demonstrating the ambiguous relationship required Supreme Court resolution).
[45] Id. at 874.
[46] The statute was created to provide prosecutors a statutory avenue to vacate wrongful convictions. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.031 (2022).
[47] This case began with Dunn’s conviction in 1991, the circuit attorney’s motion in February 2024, and the Supreme Court’s decision issued April 15, 2025, demonstrating the extended procedural timeline. See Dunn, 708 S.W.3dat 868–69.
[48] Id. at 869.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. at 868–69.
[52] See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (2022).
[53] See State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20, 24–26 (Mo. banc 2024) (requiring additional writ proceedings during the Dunn case).
[54] Dunn, 708 S.W.3d at 870 (noting court of appeals show cause order on jurisdictional question).
[55] Id. at 869.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d at 20, 23–26 (describing unusual procedural complications arising from governmental conflict).
[59] Dunn, 703 S.W.3d at 874.
[60] See State v. Schlup, 850 S.W.2d 475, 493 (Mo. banc 1993) (discussing political pressures on elected prosecutors).
[61] See Ethan Corey, Ask the Appeal: Why Do Americans Think the U.S. is Too ‘Soft’ on Crime?, The Appeal (Feb. 13, 2024), https://theappeal.org/why-do-voters-think-the-us-soft-on-crime/ (highlighting change in public opinion toward “tough on crime” policies).
[62] Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.031 (2022) (discretionary prosecutorial review) with Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (2023) (uniform statewide procedures available to all convicted individuals).
[63] Zack Smith & Charles Stimson, It’s Not Just Rising Crime: Rogue Prosecutors Are a Huge Problem, Nat’l Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-not-just-rising-crime-rogue-prosecutors-are-huge-problem-200344 (Feb. 6, 2022) (characterizing some prosecutors as “rogue” and their policies as “pro-criminal”).
[64] Id.
[65] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035 (2022).
[66] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.020 (2022).
[67] See supra notes 29, 31, 32.
[68] Id.
[69] The procedural complexity is evident throughout the case, which required multiple court proceedings, emergency stays, writs of prohibition, and ultimately Supreme Court review of a basic jurisdictional question. See generally In re Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, 708 S.W.3d 867,869-70 (2025).
[70] Id. at 868–75 (illustrating how innovative reform created additional complexity and delay).